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THE LOOSENESS OF LEGAL LANGUAGE: THE
REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD IN
THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
Naomi R. Cahnt
INTRODUCTION
For feminists working with the law, the relationship between
theory and practice has been critical, although often uneasy and
problematic.' Part of this tension between theory and practice 2
stems from inevitable, and important, questions about whether the
legal process can meaningfully address women's needs.3 Nonethe-
less, because the strength of feminist theory is grounded so deeply
in the actual experiences of women,4 an exchange between theory
t Visiting Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. Many thanks to Joan
Meier, Tony Alfieri, Clark Cunningham, Cynthia Farina, and Holly Fechner for review-
ing an earlier draft, to Nancy Tong for research assistance, and to Lei Udell for editing.
1 See, e.g., KATHARINE BARTLETT & ROSANNE KENNEDY, Introduction, in FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 1, 4 (KATHARINE BARTLETr & ROSANNE
KENNEDY eds., 1991). The following story illustrates this problem:
Several years ago I attended a small seminar where a noted feminist legal theorist
presented a brilliant paper, replete with theoretical insights into women's subordina-
tion. When she finished the presentation, we all clapped in admiration. During the
discussion period, a participant said, "Many of us are lawyers who represent women in
court, seeking protection from batterers, equal employment in the workplace, a fair trial.
Have you thought about how your theories can help us?" The noted feminist looked
blankly at the questioner. She was silent for a few seconds before she said, hesitantly,
"That is a very interesting idea. You know, I had never really thought about how my
ideas could help women in practice."
2 I am interested not only in the process of how feminist jurisprudence affects
practice, but also in more specific questions of how changes in law and methodology are
intertwined in this process. For an extraordinary study of these issues, see Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); see also Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Method,
16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 373 (1991). Abrams comments that "[t]he impact of feminism
on the methods of lawyers-those who work for legal change in the courts, legislatures,
and other public forums-is only now beginning to be explored." Id. at 374.
3 See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (1989); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics
of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599, 1687 (1991); MargaretJ. Radin,
The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1700 (1990) (arguing that rather
than think about justice in an ideal world, we should think about "nonidealjustice: given
where we now find ourselves, what is the better decision?"). These questions arise both
in substantive law and in methodological concerns. See Naomi R. Cahn, Defining Feminist
Litigation, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1991).
4 See Cahn, supra note 3; Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 1668.
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and practice should remain central to the differing visions of what
feminism 5 can be.
This is where the theoretics of practice, a developing movement
that attempts to understand the interaction between legal theory
and practice, can inform feminism.6 It studies how the lawyer per-
ceives and can empower, or do violence to, her client.7 Much of this
scholarship is based on experiences with real clients, and includes
both analysis of lawyers' struggles to translate client experiences
into language that is meaningful in the law, and critiques of the
translations.8 As scholars, looking at practice in our theorizing not
only keeps us grounded in reality, but also ensures broader partici-
pation in the law so that changes are engendered by clients as well
as lawyers, thereby challenging existing legal catagories and
methods.9
Theoretics of practice scholarship primarily has focused on
poverty law and drawn much of its critical strength from attempts to
reconstruct poverty law practices.' 0 In this Article, I use the the-
oretics of practice to examine the relationship between feminist the-
5 Feminism is not, of course, a single viewpoint, but includes many different ideas
from a variety of viewpoints. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990).
6 While no single definition describes the theoretics of practice, the thread com-
mon to all is a foundation in practice. By practice, we mean ways of arguing as well as
relating to other participants in the legal system, including clients, the relevant commu-
nities, judges, and other lawyers.
Theoretics of practice is different from practice theory, which "reintroduces agency
and practice into disciplines traditionally preoccupied with systems and structures, with-
out abandoning a recognition of the shaping power of socially constructed structures as
retreating to a methodological individualism." RosemaryJ. Coombe, Room for Maneuver:
Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 14 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 69, 71 (1989).
7 See Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 853 (1992).
8 E.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer As Translator, Representation As Text: To-
wards An Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992) [hereinafter Cun-
ningham, Lawyer As Translator]; Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking
About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989) [hereinafter Cunningham, Thinking
About Law]; Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989).
The method of study borrows-sometimes explicitly, sometimes not-from the eth-
nographic method of attempting "to provide a particularist and holistic account, based
upon... extended observation, of a single culture group." Jean G. Zorn, Lawyers, An-
thropologists, and the Study of Law: Encounters in the New Guinea Highland, 15 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 271, 274-75 (1990). Judith Stacey provides another definition of the ethno-
graphic method, describing it as "intensive participant-observation study which yields a
synthetic cultural account .... Judith Stacey, Can There be a Feminist Ethnography?, I 1
WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 21, 22 (1988); see also James Clifford, Introduction, in WRITING
CULTURE: THE PoETsCS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY 1, 7 (James Clifford & George E.
Marcus eds., 1986); Mary Black & Duane Metzger, Ethnographic Description and the Study of
Law, in THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LAw 141, 141 (Laura Nader ed., 1965).
9 See Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future of Femi-
nist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. REV. 25, 30 (1990).
10 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructing Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107 (1991); White, supra note 7.
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ory and practice by exploring specific situations involving sex and
violence against women. The language of legal doctrine about "the
reasonable woman" in sexual harassment law, battered woman self
defense law, and rape law is the text I seek to interpret.' I My per-
spective is grounded in legal practice; I wonder how feminist theory
and legal practice interact, and how both can help women. I also
examine what it means to help women; helping some women may
not help others. 12
I examine the practice of the reasonable woman standard in the
contexts of rape, sexual harassment, and domestic violence because
these areas are linked, and because the impact of this standard in
each area has important implications and lessons for the others.' 3
The three phenomena involve different forms of violence against
women; each symbolizes different forms of women's subordinated
status. 14 The reasonable woman standard raises the possibility of
changing this status by providing a legal standard that increases the
potential for effective enforcement of laws against subordinating be-
havior. The need for a new standard in sexual harassment and bat-
tered woman cases emerged from the divergence between women's
experiences and legal doctrines addressing these gender-specific
acts, 15 and the concept of the reasonable woman developed to "ac-
count" for the differences between these experiences and those of
men in a form that the legal system could comprehend and
incorporate.
Part I explores some ideological considerations relevant to the
reasonable woman concept. As a constructed image of reasonable
11 Like Joan Scott, I believe that by examining the ways that "language constructs
meaning we will also be in a position to find gender." JOAN W. ScoTT, GENDER AND THE
POLITICS OF HISTORY 55 (1988). Language in the legal process occurs in many different
settings: in court, between lawyers, between lawyers and their clients, between clients,
with courtroom clerks, etc. It is important, then, not to focus on only one type of talk.
See Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Legal Realism in Lawyer-Client Communications, in
LANGUAGE IN THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 133 (Judith Levi & Anne Walker eds., 1990) (explor-
ing law talk in various contexts).
12 See Christine A. Littleton, Does it Still Make Sense to Talk about "Women"?, 1 UCLA
WOMEN'S LJ. 15 (1991).
13 See Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8
HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 21 (1985) (connection between sexual harassment, rape, battery
and other aspects of women's subordination); see also Robin L. West, The Difference in
Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIs. WOMEN'S
L.J. 81 (1987) (same).
14 As Robin West argues, they are "gender-specific injuries." West, supra note 13,
at 82. Men, too, are battered, raped and harassed; overwhelmingly, however, these acts
happen to women. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE LJ. 1281, 1301-02 (1991).
15 See Schneider, supra note 2. For a comparable discussion between women's ac-
tual roles and legal rhetoric in the context of work and family, see Karen Czapanskiy,
Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (1991).
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behavior, the reasonable woman has several theoretical underpin-
nings, each of which has different implications for the content of the
standard. One theoretical underpinning of the reasonable woman
construct may be "difference" feminist theory, which suggests that
men and women differ as groups, and that women are more nurtur-
ing and moral than men.1 6 Through another lens, the reasonable
woman can be viewed as a construct of difference-as-dominance
feminist theory. 17 This concept persuasively shows the need to in-
clude women's experiences in a system with asymmetrical power re-
lations that has historically excluded women's participation., A
third body of theory, critical race studies, also confronts the alleged
objectivity of supposedly "neutral" rules that exclude the exper-
iences of outsiders.' 9 Such experiences may result in the need to
change universal standards. 20
In sharp contrast with the reasonable woman standard in sexual
harassment and domestic violence cases stands the reasonable
woman standard used to judge the victim's behavior in rape cases.
In rape law, this standard implicitly requires women to conform to a
certain image, developed largely by men, before the legal system
will recognize their experience as rape. For example, women are
still blamed for provoking or seducing men, unless they meet the
male-set standard of "reasonable" resistance. 21 Thus in rape law
16 Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 797, 799, 807 (1989); See
infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text. Williams provides an insightful critique of
difference theory by showing that it adopts for women positive attributes from tradi-
tional stereotypes, such as women's connection to others, while discarding negative
ones, such as women's passivity. Williams, supra. Additionally, as discussed infra, differ-
ence theory rarely attributes positive values to men. See alsoJeanne L. Schroeder, Abduc-
tion from the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109,
124-130 (1991)(difference feminism establishes a universal male that is opposite to
female).
17 See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Legal Perspectives on Sexual Difference, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 213 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990). As discussed
infra at notes 65-95 and accompanying text, I believe the standard results from a mixture
of difference and dominance theories.
18 See HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW 1, 6-11 (June Starr &Jane F. Col-
lier eds., 1989) (discussion of power relations in the legal order).
19 See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, 1989 U.
CHI. L.F. 139 (analyzing different experiences of white women, black men, and black
women); Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813
(1992); Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Essay in Formal Equal Opportunity, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2142 (1989).
20 See Harris v. International Paper, 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515-16 (D. Me. 1991) (ex-
ploring different responses of whites and blacks to particularly harrassing behavior, and
noting that "the fact finder must 'walk a mile in the victim's shoes' to understand" the
effects of discriminatory acts).
21 See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) (discussing societal expectations of reason-
able behavior of a raped woman); see also Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813
(1991) (analogies between rape and sexual harassment law) [hereinafter Sex at Work].
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the image of the reasonable woman hurts women, confining them
within a particular discourse.2 2 In rape law, men developed this
standard to protect other men who, in their eyes, were wrongfully
accused of rape. As a result, the rape law standard's attributes of
reasonableness differ from those embodied in the sexual harass-
ment and domestic violence law standard. 23 The image of the rea-
sonably raped woman, because of its ubiquitous nature and
foundations in popular culture, constrains legal thought and lan-
guage.24 Once such a stock figure is developed, it is difficult to dis-
place, to find new language to think beyond it.
Part II illustrates the potential dangers inherent in a reasonable
woman standard in any context by discussing stories that construct
reasonable women as told by lawyers and judges. At the center of
this Part is a story about a reasonable woman based on clients that I
have represented. Ms. Sims was a battered woman who, among
other things, had stabbed her husband with a knife after running
into his house. Our challenge of representing her as feminist law-
yers required us to think through what it means to be a reasonable
woman. This client differs from those portrayed by other theorists
of practice because her story, in her own words, may not have been
entirely sympathetic to a legal tribunal. Her story thus shows the
need to ensure that legal constructs reflect real stories, and shows
how the powers of doctrine (not just the powers in the attorney-
client relationship) distort.
I argue that even in sexual harassment and domestic violence
cases, where the standards were developed to respond to women's
needs, the theory and practice of the reasonable woman standard
further stereotypes and disempowers. While its use may empower
some women, in the practical reality of the attorney-client relation-
ship and in the courtroom, the reasonable women standard both en-
courages client passivity and ignores the complexities of the client's
situation. 25 Moreover, the use of separate standards operates to en-
trench differences between men and women, rather than to establish
22 By discourse, I mean "a way of talking about actions and relationships .... Like
other discourses, law is limiting in that it asserts some meanings and silences others."
SALLY E. MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN 9 (1990).
23 See Delgado, supra note 19.
24 See Lynne N. Henderson, Review Essay: What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S LJ. 193, 228 (1988)("Confusion and ambivalence about rape are deeply em-
bedded in our cultural consciousness and structures .... ).
25 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and
the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 195 (1986); see also
Alfieri, supra note 10.
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a standard that transcends issues of sameness and difference 26 and
provides for even more effective litigation strategies. 27 Just like a
reasonable man standard, the reasonable woman standard is biased
and deliberately ignores the reality that women's experiences are
diverse. Should the actions of an Hispanic lesbian woman be mea-
sured against those of a reasonable woman, or against those of a
reasonable Hispanic lesbian woman? In failing to address these di-
verse experiences, the reasonable woman standard illustrates femi-
nists' dilemmas over how to reconstruct the law (including attorney-
client relationships) so that the dominant discourse is not male.
Feminist challenges to the traditional stereotype of the reasonable
man and its categorization of women, too often result in new stereo-
types and inflexible categories of our own. 28
Finally, Part III suggests the beginnings of a new paradigm
based on feminism as well as the theoretics of practice (including my
own experiences in representing victims of domestic violence and
sexual harassment), and applies it to generate some practice strate-
gies. Using this paradigm, I reinterpret the reasonable person stan-
dard to include the experiences of both women and other excluded
groups, as well as alternative conceptions of reasonableness. I ex-
amine the attorney-client relationship, and show how we can begin
the process of developing new constructs that respect client auton-
omy, and create spaces for women in the law without fostering ste-
reotypes and passivity.
26 See Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Tort
Course, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISm 41, 64 (1989).
The debate over whether men and women should be treated the same or differently
has divided feminists for decades. For a collection of citations to recent literature on the
debate, see Leslie Bender, From Gender Diference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan
and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1, 4 nn. 6-8 (1990); see also THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIvES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE, supra note 17 (collection of essays on differences
between men and women).
27 See Naomi R. Cahn, Speaking Differences: The Rules and Relationships of Litigants' Dis-
courses, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1705 (1992) (book review).
28 By itself, categorization is not inherently destructive, so long as "we can recog-
nize changes and interactions within the category." MariJ. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified
and the False Consdousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1763, 1773 (1990). At the same
time, however, it is critical to examine whose community norms determine categories
such as reasonableness, and then to challenge any stasis within the category. See Nancy
S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual
Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990).
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I
SOME STORIES ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
A. The Challenge to the Reasonable Man
The reasonable man standard remains an entrenched and per-
vasive standard by which courts measure potentially illegal conduct.
Tort law, criminal law, and employment discrimination law all em-
ploy this standard 29 to determine whether conduct is appropriate.
That conduct is acceptable if it is "reasonable" is one of those "neu-
tral" principles with which everyone can agree. As one critique
points out, "[t]he notion that reason is divorced from 'merely con-
tingent' existence still predominates in contemporary Western
thought .... ,,0
The standard actually incorporates two different, although in-
terrelated, requirements: first, that conduct be "reasonable," and
second, that conduct be that expected of a "man." By "reasonable
man," of course, the standard purports to be universal, to include
all "mankind," and in practice courts have applied it to women as
well as men.3'
Feminism challenges both aspects of the standard: the implicit
assumption of a "man" as the standard, as well as the assumption of
reasonableness. The male bias inherent in a standard that explicitly
excludes consideration of women as reasonable actors is obvious.3 2
Using a term that is centered on a "man" channels and informs
the content of the standard even when the court (or jury) knows that
29 See Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete?
A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 435 (1981) (noting
the ubiquitousness of the standard and exploring its use in criminal law).
30 Jane Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, in FEMI-
NISM/POSTMODERNISM 39, 43 (LindaJ. Nicholson ed., 1990).
31 Ronald K.L. Collins, Language, History and the Legal Process: A Profile of the "Reason-
able Man, " 8 Rur.-CAM. LJ. 311 (1977).
32 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3, 20-25 (1988); see also Susan Bordo, Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Skepticism,
in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 30, at 133, 137. For a discussion of the difficul-
ties in defining "man," seeJuDITH BTrrLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990); see also SuzanneJ.
Kessler, The Mfedical Construction of Gender; Case Aanagement of Intersexed Infants, 16 SIGNs 3
(1990) (discussing assignment of gender in children born without defined sex character-
istics). At a very basic level, there are at least three linguistic problems with the "generic
masculine": first, there is a "nonparallelism between the male and female terms"; sec-
ond, it is unclear in particular instances whether the term includes or excludes women;
which, in turn, is partially caused by the third problem of exclusivity, because "man"
sometimes does just mean men and not women. Wendy Martyna, The Psychology of the
Generic Masculine, in WOMEN AND LANGUAGE IN LITERATURE AND SocIETY 69, 69-78 (Sally
McConnell-Ginet et al. eds., 1980); see also Collins, supra note 31, at 315-17 (noting that,
historically, courts may have intended the reasonable man standard to apply only to
men, while they adopted a standard for women closer to that of children).
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they are applying the standard to a woman.33 In recognition of
these problems, courts have articulated, as at least a cosmetic im-
provement, a reasonable person standard.3 4 In application, how-
ever, little but the male language of the standard has changed.3 5
This leads to feminism's second critique: a reasonable person
may resemble a reasonable man because the term "reasonable" is
problematic. Existing conceptions of reasonableness are gendered
through their creation of a standard of conduct based on rationality,
exclusive of emotions and morality.3 6 Feminist theory has re-ex-
amined the reasonableness standard as part of a critique of "objec-
tive" standards.3 7 So-called neutral and objective standards may
contain unstated assumptions that are actually gendered.3 8 This
questioning of "neutral" rules has taken many forms: Regina Austin
has challenged the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
as gender, race, and class biased;39 Joan Williams has challenged a
33 It is a truism that language influences and structures experience. ROBIN LAKOFF,
LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE 1-50 (1975); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DAN-
GEROUS THINGS 39-84 (1987).
The reasonable man standard renders women invisible. See Donovan & Wildman,
supra note 29, at 436; see also Collins, supra note 31, at 315-17 (suggesting that this was
based in the common law view that husband and wife are the same person in the law).
34 E.g., State v. Norman, 366 S.E.2d 586, 591 (N.C. App. 1988) (battered woman
case finding that "person of ordinary firmness" might have killed a sleeping husband in
self-defense), rev'd on appeal, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989)("person of ordinary firmness"
would not have killed a sleeping husband in self-defense).
35 See Finley, supra note 26, at 59 (in her torts course she includes some cases "in
which it appears that, despite use of 'reasonable person' language, courts are evaluating
a woman's conduct according to a male standard."). See generally Martha Minow, Supreme
Court Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987)(relationship between gen-
der and judicial action). The contribution of Richard Delgado andJean Stefancic to this
Symposium discusses how difficult it is to recognize contemporary expressions of dis-
crimination. Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992).
36 Bender, supra note 26, at 23. Rationality is not a neutral standard, and includes
its own gendered versions of emotion and morality. See Ehrenreich, supra note 28 (dis-
cussing construction of meaning of "reasonableness").
37 See JANE FLAX, THINKING FRAGMENTS (1990); Bordo, supra note 32, at 136-37
(ascribing questioning of objectivity and neutrality to movements that emerged "to
make a claim to the legitimacy of marginalized cultures"); Donovan & Wildman, supra
note 29; infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. The challenge to reasonableness res-
onates historically with the legal realist challenge to abstract formalist concepts. SeeJo-
seph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 503 (1988).
Objectivity is not, of course, just a topic for feminist inquiry; other outsiders have
developed powerful critiques of it. See Delgado, supra note 19, at 108 (the objective
approach is accepted because it embodies the views of the stronger, more culturally
powerful, party, and renders irrelevant the perspective of the subordinated party).
38 See MINOW, supra note 5, at 51; Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting it and Los-
ing it, 38J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 51 (1988).
39 Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988); see Martha Chamallas & Linda Kerber,
Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990)(suggesting
that the apparently gender neutral valuation in tort law of physical security and property
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workplace that establishes an ideal worker based on male norms,
which does not include child care.40
On a practical level, feminists have challenged the reasonable
man standard in an attempt to modify it to correspond with wo-
men's lives. The challenge to a male standard of reasonableness has
been successful in two areas discussed in this Article: sexual harass-
ment law and battered women self defense cases.4 1 In rape law,
however, though standards have begun to change, a distorted ex-
pectation concerning the reasonable behavior of women persists not
only because a male legal system established what constitutes rea-
sonable behavior, but also because rape is a deeply entrenched sym-
bol of male control over women. 42 For black women, rape
represents an even more complex form of oppression: it "includes
not only a vulnerability to rape and a lack of legal protection radi-
cally different from that experienced by white women, but also a
unique ambivalence" because black men are disproportionately ac-
cused and punished for rape as compared to white men.43
B. The Reasonable Woman Standard
The parameters of the reasonable woman are largely deter-
mined by the type of case in which the standard is used, and many
are still very much in flux. Reasonable woman standards are
designed to reflect women's perceptions of what constitutes sexual
harassment 44 and what constitutes a sufficient basis for a battered
woman to kill her abuser.45 Unlike in the sexual harassment and
battered women's contexts, in rape cases the reasonable women's
standard rarely benefits women, instead reflecting men's percep-
tions of what constitutes force and consent in sexual intercourse.46
over emotional security and interpersonal relationships actually disadvantages women
when it comes to torts for which there is no comparable male injury).
40 E.g., Williams, supra note 16, at 822.
41 See infra notes 49-64 and accompanying text. It has, of course, been successful in
other areas not covered by this Article.
42 See Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 21, at 814-15 (Rape is an area of the law where
"traditional male prerogatives are most protected, male power most jealously
preserved.").
43 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 601; see Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and
Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAw 195, 205-08 (David Kairys ed., 1990); see also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 250 (Douglas, J. concurring) (noting studies showing that the
death penalty was disproportionately applied to blacks convicted of rape).
44 See Abrams, supra note 3, at 1206.
45 See Elizabth M. Schneider, Equal Rights for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-De-
fense, 15 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 623, 630-38 (1980).
46 In an oft-cited quote, Susan Estrich notes, "the reasonable woman, it seems, is
not a schoolboy 'sissy'; she is a real man." EsTRICH, supra note 21, at 65.
When a woman has been raped, the law (and society) impose expectations concern-
ing her behavior. Helena Michie labels these expectations "the cultural master-narrative
1406 [Vol. 77:1398
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The standard is not defined explicitly so much as it is merely used
without elaboration. 47 To give it meaning, it is regularly contrasted
to the perspective of a reasonable man; thus, implicitly (and often
explicitly), there is an underlying belief that the reasonable woman
differs from the reasonable man.48 The standard thus helps women
win in situations where a reasonable man standard might preclude
their claims.
The standard may include either a subjective (what did this rea-
sonable woman think at the time?) and/or an objective (how would
other reasonable women react?) element or both.49 Accordingly, it
of rape that says that in all cases of rape women are complicitous, that rape is not a rape
in the first place." Helena Michie, The Greatest Story (N)ever Told. The Spectacle of Recanta-
tion, 9 GENDERS 19, 21 (1990). As an example, consider the case of the young black
female student at St. John's University who said that she had been sodomized and sexu-
ally assaulted by six white male students, most of whom belonged to the school's la-
crosse team. Joseph P. Fried, 3 St. John's Students Acquitted of Sexually Assaulting a Woman,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1991, at Al. At three of the men's criminal trial, the woman testi-
fied that they made her drink a mixture of vodka and orange soda, and then forced her
to perform fellatio. The defendants' lawyers argued that the woman consented to
whatever sexual activity occurred, and that she subsequently fabricated the story be-
cause she was ashamed of her actions. After the jury acquitted the three men, some
jurors explained that there were too many inconsistencies in all of the testimony they
had heard. John KifnerJurors Say Complainant Didn't Seem Believable, N.Y. TiMES,July 24,
1991, at B4. As with many sexual harassment stories, this rape story was not perfect.
On the campus, one student applauded the verdict, and asked, " 'Who in their right
mind would have gone to a house where eight guys lived?'" Id. As Susan Estrich asked
about the woman who claimed that William Kennedy Smith raped her after he picked
her up in a bar and brought her to the Kennedy family compound in Palm Beach, "Can
you rape a woman who voluntarily comes up for a drink at 3:30 A.M.? ... The right
question in rape cases is not what she did wrong, but what he did." Susan Estrich, The
Real Palm Beach Story, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at A25.
Another example of the general distrust of rape victims is contained in the film
THELMA AND LOUISE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1991). Thelma flirts with a man who plies
her with drinks, and then almost rapes her (she is rescued by the well-timed intervention
of Louise). Louise kills the man. The two women begin driving away; when Thelma
suggests calling the police, Louise points out that they would never believe two women
who were drunk and who had been flirting.
47 See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 624, 626-67 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Keith, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
48 In Ellison v. Brady, the court noted:
A complete understanding of the victim's view requires, among other
things, an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women. Con-
duct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend many women
.... [W]e believe that many women share common concerns which men
do not necessarily share.
924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). See Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that men and women are vulnerable in
different ways and offended by different behavior); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims ofAbu-
sive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1459 (1984).
49 For example, the Ellison court used an objective test, explaining that a plaintiff
must allege conduct that "a reasonable woman would consider sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment." 924 F.2d at 879 (citation omitted). In another sexual harassment case, the court
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requires both an individualized inquiry and a "community norm"
inquiry.
The reasonable woman is used fairly consistently in different
contexts: in sexual harassment cases, it is used to judge whether a
similarly situated woman would have felt harassed; in domestic vio-
lence cases, it is purportedly used to judge whether another woman
would have felt comparably endangered; and in rape cases, it is used
to judge whether another woman would have felt herself raped. By
providing an authoritative image of acceptable conduct, the reason-
able woman standard enhances the credibility of women whose con-
duct or beliefs conform with that image. Its use makes women's
accounts believable within a system that puts the reasonable man on
a pedestal and denies legal protection to unreasonable behavior.50
used a similar objective test, but also required the plaintiff to show that the discrimina-
tion adversely affected her. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480-81,
1486 (3rd Cir. 1990)(two female police officers who were regularly subjected to deroga-
tory and obscene name calling, and to pornographic pictures in the workplace could
have alleged "a work environment hostile and offensive to women of reasonable sensi-
tivitiess"); see Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D.
Fla. 1991), appeal docketed, No. 91-3655 (11th Cir. 1991) (same test). The reasonable
woman standard is actually only one component of a larger test to determine hostile
environment sexual harassment.
In State v. Wanrow-a women's self-defense case that has been used as a model for
battered women's cases-that court used a subjective test, stating that Ms. Wanrow "was
entitled to have the jury consider her actions in light of her own perceptions of the
situation." 559 P.2d 548, 559 (Wash. 1977).
50 As Kathleen Lahey points out, "various kind[s] of abuse... [including) sexism
... condition and shape people in ways that often make it easy to label them 'unreasona-
ble.' " Kathleen Lahey, Reasonable Women and the Law, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:
FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 3, 5 (Martha A. Fineman & Nancy Thomadsen eds., 1991).
Senate hearings on the nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to the Supreme
Court dramatically illustrate the need for a reasonable woman standard. After Anita
Hill, a law professor at the University of Oklahoma, reported that Judge Thomas had
sexually harassed her, the judiciary committee attempted to determine the "truth" of-
her allegations.
Although Professor Hill described her experiences, often in graphic terms, there
was a sense throughout the Senate debates that many men did not "get" it-did not
understand sexual harassment. E.g., Anna Quindlen, Public & Private: Listen to Us, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at A25. As Senator Dennis DeConcini explained his reaction to
Professor Hill's statement, "people have to make their judgments based on what hap-
pens to them in their life at their period of time. I don't say that it didn't happen but I'm
convinced that there's another side to this story." Excerpts from 2 Panel Members' Comments
on Allegations Against Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at A20; see Kathryn Abrams, Hear-
ing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991) (discussing how narrative accords with
personal experiences). His attitude of incredulity typifies that of many Senators and
shows, in the words of Professor Susan Deller Ross, that men simply may not under-
stand what it feels like to be "a vulnerable and trapped female." Maureen Dowd, The
Thomas Nomination: The Senate and Sexism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at Al, A21.
Repeatedly, Senators questioned how a woman could remain silent for ten years
about egregious sexual harassment, and even maintain a cordial relationship with her
harasser. Excerpts From Senate's Hearings on the Thomas Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1991, at A12, A15. Beyond questioning Professor Hill's actions in not reporting the
REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
In some cases, the reasonable woman standard has successfully
helped women win sexual harassment and domestic violence
cases.51 Indeed, the "reasonable woman" is starting to become
something of a stock figure 52 in such cases because it helps women
explain their experiences to judges and juries. For example, in sex-
ual harassment cases, the standard shows why a woman might find
that sexually explicit pictures in the workplace constitute harass-
ment;53 in domestic violence cases, it helps explain why a woman
might reasonably feel that she is in imminent danger at a time when
her husband is sleeping.54
In both sexual harassment and battered woman's cases, expert
testimony has helped to establish the conduct and reactions of the
reasonable woman,55 providing additional support for the reasona-
bleness of the woman's feelings.5 6 For example, in State v. Stewart,57
Ms. Stewart had been repeatedly abused by her husband: he had
beaten her with a baseball bat, shot one of her cats, and threatened
repeatedly to kill her.5 8 She shot him while he slept. At her trial,
she called an expert witness who testified that she suffered from bat-
tered woman syndrome.5 9 The court held that "expert evidence of
the battered woman syndrome is relevant to a determination of the
sexual harassment, Senators also raised questions about her character. Andrew Rosen-
thal, White House Role in Thomas Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991, at Al. Pennsylvania
Senator Alan Specter accused Professor Hill of perjury. Id. In an extreme example of
male incomprehension, Senator Thurmond noted that he had "been contacted by sev-
eral psychiatrists, suggesting that it is entirely possible she is suffering from delusions.
Perhaps she is living in a fantasy world." 137 CONG. REC., S14,649 (daily ed. Oct. 15,
1991) (remarks of Senator Thurmond). In evaluating all of the evidence, Senator
DeConcini (who voted to confirm Justice Thomas) explained that it was appropriate to
use a "reasonable person" standard. Id. at S14,656 (statement of Senator DeConcini).
51 See, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d at 872 (sexual harassment); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364, 577 (N.J. 1984) (self-defense) (expert testimony is relevant to determining the rea-
sonableness of the belief of a battered woman that she was in imminent danger).
52 For discussion of "stock stories," see generally Delgado & Stefancic, supra note
35; Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984).
53 See Robinson v.Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
54 See State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 820 (N.D. 1983) (expert testimony on
the battered woman syndrome helps the jury to decide "the existence and reasonable-
ness of the accused's belief that force was necessary to protect herself from imminent
harm.").
55 Robinson, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (sexual harassment); Kelly, 478 A.2d at 364 (bat-
tered woman's syndrome).
56 As Kim Lane Scheppele explains, "The use of expert testimony allows a woman
to win a case against a man by having a 'qualified person' testify that she was suffering
from trauma or delusion .. " Kim L. Scheppele, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Considering
Considered Stories 33 (Nov. 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Cornell Law
Review).
57 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988).
58 Id. at 575.
59 Id. at 576.
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reasonableness of the defendant's perception of danger." 60 Evi-
dently, even under a reasonable battered woman standard, the rea-
sonableness of a particular woman's conduct is not always obvious;
she often needs additional corroboration. Expert testimony pro-
vides the means to look outside of "objective" rules and expecta-
tions; that is, while many women have been raped, battered, or
sexually harassed, their experiences may not be familiar to judges or
juries. Alternatively, because prevailing societal myths blame wo-
men for letting these things happen to them, it is easy to believe that
these women are aberrational, and even for other victims not to rec-
ognize the feelings. 61
Indeed, this is how the reasonable woman standard works in
rape cases. Several myths exist about how women act that make
rape cases difficult, such as: "women mean 'yes' when they say 'no';
women are 'asking for it' when they wear provocative clothes, go to
bars alone, or simply walk down the street at night; only virgins can
be raped." 62 In the future, the reasonable woman in battered wo-
men self-defense cases and in sexual harassment cases may come to
resemble the reasonable woman in rape cases, rather than the rape
standard changing. 63
The following section explores the reasonable woman in femi-
nist theory. This examination helps to illustrate why a new "quasi-
metanarrative" 64 has been created to replace the reasonable man,
and how the reasonable woman fits into some debates in contempo-
rary feminist theory. Because the reasonable woman standard is
also a construct which attorneys use in practice when seeking to rep-
60 Id. at 577.
61 See Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problems of Transition: Perspec-
tives on Male Battering of Women and the Problem of Transition, 1989 U. CHI. L.F. 23. These
myths are held by women, as wIl as men. Morrison Torrey reports:
In one experiment, female subjects believed that over 25 percent of the
female population would derive some pleasure from being victimized [by
rape], even though the subjects themselves clearly believed that they per-
sonally would not derive pleasure from being victimized under any
circumstances.
Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape
Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1013, 1039-1040 (1991).
62 Torrey, supra note 61, at 1015. Professor Torrey notes the need for expert testi-
mony concerning the falseness of these myths in order to change attitudes and expecta-
tions about women's behavior. Id. at 1067.
63 See Estrich, Sex at Work, supra note 20 (making similar observation with respect to
the standards in rape and sexual harassment cases); letter from Nancy Ehrenreich,
3/5/92 (on file with Cornell Law Review).
64 "Quasi-metanarratives" are concepts which "tacitly presuppose some commonly
held but unwarranted and essentialist assumptions about the nature of human beings
and the conditions for social life." Nancy Fraser & Linda Nicholson, Social Criticism with-
out Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism and Postmodernism, in FEMI-
NIsM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 30, at 19, 27.
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resent "reasonable women," later sections then examine how these
theoretical debates can inform future practice strategies.
C. The Reasonable Woman and Feminist Theory
Feminist practice 65 and scholarship are mainly concerned with
issues of sameness and differences between and among men and
women. 66 Two somewhat overlapping perspectives from within
feminism exist on these issues: sameness-difference and domina-
tion-subordination. Critical race theory adds a third perspective.
"Sameness" feminist theories are concerned with similarities
between men and women, and differences among women; they "tar-
get overtly sex-based legislation as problematic because it limits
how we may define ourselves and how we can unfold over time."'67
"Difference" theories are concerned with differences between men
(as a group) and women (as a group); theorists argue that "abolish-
ing overt sex categories in the law does not ... directly attack wo-
men's disadvantages and subordination. " 68 Catharine MacKinnon
rejects both sameness and difference feminism, arguing that these
theories do not address the experiences of women who live under
conditions of sex inequality. Both sameness and difference femi-
nists use a male standard to evaluate issues of sameness or differ-
ence, and MacKinnon argues that women simply are not similarly
situated to men, especially with respect to issues of sexual assault
and reproduction. 69 Indeed, she believes that the sameness ap-
proach to legal issues obscures women's inequality because it finds
discrimination only where men and women are similarly situated. 70
Her theory also diverges from difference feminism in that she ob-
jects to reifying differences, perceiving this as insulting because it
65 See ALICE ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD (1990), for an historical perspective on the
sameness-difference debate among radical feminists.
66 Joan Williams begins her 1989 article as follows: "I start out, as have many
others, from the deep split among American feminists between 'sameness' and 'differ-
ence.' " Williams, supra note 16, at 798; see also Bender, supra note 26.
Feminist jurisprudence and epistemology challenge the exclusion of women's ex-
periences from prevailing discourses and the (male) perspective of the all-knowing, ob-
jective person. See generally Marie Ashe, Mind's Opportunity: Birthing a Post-Structuralist
Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129 (1987); Clare Dalton, Where We Stand:
Observations on the Situation of Feminist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 1 (1989);
Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method,
11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989); Heather R. Wishik, To Question Everything: The Inquir-
ies of Feminist Jurisprudence, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 64 (1985).
67 Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 108.
68 Id.
69 MacKinnon, supra note 14, at 1296-99.
70 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 217
(1989); Holly Fechner, Note, Toward an Expanded Conception of Law Reform: Sexual Harass-
ment Law and the Reconstruction of Facts, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 475, 483 (1990).
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only affirms, as "feminine," what a male society has permitted wo-
men to be.7 1 MacKinnon contends that sex discrimination results
from the power inequality between men and women, and she has
developed a difference-as-dominance theory.72 Under MacKinnon's
theory, gender is a hierarchy constructed by men. 73 Because men
have power, they have constructed this hierarchy of inequality.74
Difference is the way that men dominate women.
Like feminists, other outsider groups have developed new ways
of challenging how difference is constructed. Critical race theory,
which focuses on the relationship between the law and race, criti-
ques how law "create[s] racial categories and legitimates racial sub-
ordination. ' 75 Critical race theorists believe that racism is part of
American culture, 76 and that telling counterstories about the vic-
tim's experience may help to change the dominant culture. 77
Through these stories, others may be able to recognize the com-
plexity of oppression for outsiders. 78
Even though some feminists are seeking to move beyond the
sameness-difference discussions and related ideas, 79 and to incorpo-
rate insights from critical race theories, these discussions are still
useful in sorting out the significance of the reasonable woman stan-
dard. We cannot move beyond the sameness-difference debate until
we better understand its implications.
Sameness feminism suggests that the reasonable woman stan-
dard is too limiting. Such a standard perpetuates distinctions be-
tween men and women, rather than developing a standard
applicable to both sexes. Thus, sameness theories would advocate a
reasonable person standard. Difference feminism critiques a rea-
71 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Diference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMI-
NISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW" 32, 39 (1987).
72 Others have developed modifications of MacKinnon's approach. Ruth Colker
bases her analysis of sex discrimination on the antisubordination principle. Ruth
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003
(1986). Under this approach, any policy or practice that contributes to the subordina-
tion of an historically dominated group is discriminatory.
73 MACKINNON, supra note 70, at 227.
74 Id. at 219.
75 Crenshaw, supra note 43, at 213 n.7. She emphasizes that there is no single defi-
nition of critical race theory. The first conference on critical race theory was held in July
1989. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 758 n.2.
76 Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1389, 1395
(1991).
77 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narra-
tive, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
78 Crenshaw, supra note 43, at 212.
79 E.g., Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986);Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Same-
ness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race
Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 296; Williams, supra note 16.
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sonable person approach, because only the language, and not the
underlying content, changes. It would call for a reasonable woman
standard that takes into account women's perceptions and exper-
iences that differ from men's, and likewise a reasonable man stan-
dard that reflects these different experiences. Dominance theorists
might articulate a reasonable woman perspective for both men and
women,80 imposing women's perspectives onto men's lives, 8l just as
men's perspectives have been imposed on women.8 2 The problem
would be determining a woman's perspective that is developed
outside of the structures which subordinate women.8 3
As a theoretical construct, the reasonable woman standard ac-
cords nicely with difference feminism because it focuses on similari-
ties among women and differences with men.8 4 An examination of
the premises of difference feminism reveals that the reasonable
woman standard parallels difference theories. Consequently, criti-
ques of difference theory provide insights into the shortcomings of
the reasonable woman standard from which we can generate more
effective practice strategies.
Many difference theorists draw upon the work of psychologist
Carol Gilligan8 5 and philosopher Nel Noddings.8 6 These "cultural
feminists"87 assert that women use an ethic of care in their moral
reasoning, while men are more oriented to an ethic of rights.88 Dif-
80 See Ruth Colker, Feminist Consciousness and the State: A Basis for Cautious Optimism, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1146, 1157 (1990) (review of MacKinnon).
81 Id
82 See MACKINNON, supra note 70, at 183.
83 Id. at 117. For a critique of false consciousness, see Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and
Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990) (suggesting alternative strategies to describe
women's choices, such as articulating multi-causal explanations).
84 However, unlike dominance theory, which suggests a new standard for all based
on a reasonable woman, difference theory suggests different standards based on sex. As
discussed supra notes 44-64 and accompanying text, courts have contrasted reasonable
men and women, rather than suggesting a reasonable woman's perspective should con-
trol the action of both sexes.
85 E.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982) [hereinafter GILLIGAN, DiF-
FERENT VOICE]; CAROL GILLIGAN, MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN (Carol Gilligan et al.,
eds., 1988) [hereinafter GILLIGAN, MORAL DOMAIN].
86 E.g., NEL NODDINGS, WOMEN AND EVIL (1990); NEL NODDINGS, CARING (1984)
[hereinafter NODDINGS, CARING].
87 See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988).
88 This perspective views women as more caring and oriented towards relationships
than men. Women tend to perceive morally troubling problems as situations in which
people might be hurt, RAND JACK & DANA C. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL
DECISIONS 173 (1989), and try to resolve conflicts by using strategies that maintain con-
nection and relationship, NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 86, at 8. Correspondingly, wo-
men are contextual, looking at the concrete circumstances surrounding any problem.
GILLIGAN, DIFFERENT VOICE, supra note 85, at 38; NODDINGS, CARING, supra note 86, at 8,
96; Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA.
L. REV. 543, 587 (1986). Men, by contrast, are oriented towards individual autonomy
and impartial rules. They tend to see problems in terms of violations of rights, rather
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ference feminism criticizes the legal system because (white) men
constructed it to accord with male values, overlooking or devaluing
female values. The legal system values claims of individual rights,
and overlooks claims that are based on interconnection and respon-
sibility. A legal system based on connection, rather than on compet-
ing rights, would value different aspects of each case, and might
result in court opinions that "cr[y] out in anguish about the lessons
of history, power and domination, '89 rather than opinions that use
"neutral" language. It might result in according the right to shelter,
a basic human need, a higher status than the right to own property,
a male assertion of individual rights. 90 Procedurally, litigation
might involve more negotiation and mediation, rather than aggres-
sive litigation battles. 91
For women in the workplace, difference feminism appears to
free women from the need to succeed according to male stan-
dards,92 because it aspires for a workplace that appreciates both tra-
ditionally male and female attributes. It allows women to value both
motherhood and work. This newly restructured workplace would
"fit female persons and lifestyles to the same extent they now fit
male ones." 93 In battered women's cases, feminists have developed
an image of a reasonable battered woman as a way not only to ex-
plain battered women who kill their husbands, but also to justify the
need for special intrafamily statutes that offer protection to battered
women.
94
than relationships between people. JACK &JACK, supra, at 173. Men are more likely to
resolve conflicts by examining competing rights, and applying neutral and abstract stan-
dards. Nona Plessner Lyons, Two Perspectives: On Self, Relationships, and Morality, in
MORAL DOMAIN, supra note 85, at 35.
89 Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 897 (1989) (discussing dissent in
City of Richmond v. Croson) 488 U.S. 469, 528 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 JACK & JACK, supra note 88, at 167-68; see also Bender, supra note 32; see, e.g.,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989) (Blackmun,J., dissent-
ing) (contrasting the (nonexistent) duty to rescue from an ethic of right and an ethnic of
care); Tracy Higgins, Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of
Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325 (1990) (contrasting treatment of pregnant, drug-ad-
dicted women from an ethic of right and an ethic of care perspective).
91 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985).
92 June Carbone & Margaret Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 984 (1991).
93 Christine Littleton, Equality and Feminist Theory, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1043, 1052
(1987).
94 For the development of this image on the criminal side, see LENORE E. WALKER,
TERRIFYING LOVE (1990); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984);
LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter WALKER, BATrERED
WOMAN]; Schneider, supra note 25. On the civil side, see SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND
MALE VIOLENCE (1982).
REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
Given that existing legal standards generally exclude women's
experiences, a new standard that centers and values women's exper-
iences is needed. To ensure that women's lives are adequately rec-
ognized, this recommended standard accordingly recognizes that
women and men may need different treatment.95 The reasonable
woman standard is a powerful development in practice for women
in sexual harassment and self-defense cases.
II
MORE STORIES ABOUT REASONABLE WOMEN: FEMINIST
THEORY, STEREOTYPES, CATEGORIES, AND
CLIENTS
A. Double-Edged Nature: Stereotypes and Categories
Notwithstanding its many benefits, the reasonable woman stan-
dard is problematic. Not only does it remind us of earlier stereo-
types of women as more pure and moral than men,96 but it also
reduces women's experiences by attempting to capture the essen-
tial, relegating "other" experiences to the margins of acceptance.
While the standard nonetheless has enabled women to win some
cases, and it may also depict some valuable attributes that can con-
tribute to new possibilities of lawyering on behalf of women, its
problems ultimately overwhelm its utility.
First, the reasonable woman standard is reminisent of earlier
dominant images of white middle class women. The prevailing dis-
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries depicted women as
pure, chaste, virtuous, and altruistic. 97 Today, women are still en-
95 See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279,
1299 (1987).
96 Joan C. Williams, Domesticity as the Dangerous Supplement of Liberalism, 2J. WOMEN'S
HIsT. 69, 71-72 (1991) (men were associated with baseness, women with "higher"
virtues).
97 See Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q 151
(1966); see also SUZANNE LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG 232-34 (1984) (sug-
gesting that while the true womanhood cult was closer to reality than is comfortable, it
was a conservative response to changes in women's status). In Victorian literature, wo-
men were generally depicted as thin, delicate creatures. They rarely ate because to eat
was to display hunger and sexuality; the very absence of female bodily needs defined
women. HELENA MICHIE, THE FLESH MADE WORD (1987). It is important to note the
many women were excluded by this discourse: women of color, lesbians, and women of
a lower socioeconomic class. See HAZEL CARBY, RECONSTRUCTING WOMANHOOD 23-30
(1989) (contrasting discourse that defined the roles of the white plantation mistress and
female slaves); see also Harris, supra note 43, at 598-601 (exploring differences between
rhetoric of rape, which is based on white women's experiences, and the meaning of rape
to black women). In the early twentieth century, these stereotypes resulted in courts
upholding "protective" employment restrictions for women. E.g., Muller v. Oregon,
208 U.S. 412 (1908) (limiting hours women could work).
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couraged to reject self-interest. 98 Similarly, the reasonable woman
standard today denies the needs and realities of women in order to
create them as passive, delicate creatures. 99 By definition, the rea-
sonable woman standard establishes certain expectations for women
that are different than those for men. A reasonable woman is of-
fended by workplace decorations that depict nude women; a reason-
able woman will not go to a man's house at three a.m. (nor allow a
man into her house at that time) unless she expects sex, and will
report promptly to the authorities if her virtue is violated; a reason-
able woman will not tolerate repeated battering or, if she does, she
will certainly not respond aggressively or resort to violence herself.
The reasonable woman thus becomes a victim who needs protec-
tion; when her actions can be portrayed as those of a victim, she is
protected by the courts. Other women do not, unfortunately, fit the
reasonable woman stereotype.
A second problem with the reasonable woman standard is that
it does not accommodate the experiences of all women. Women
define harassing behavior differently. 100 Some women accept as
normal operating behavior actions that other women would equate
with harassment; indeed, various forms of sexual harassment are so
pervasive that many women have learned to "take it and smile," lest
they be labelled an "uptight bitch."'' The reasonable woman stan-
dardizes harassing behavior, making it conform to a certain stan-
dard before it is legally actionable. Women who have suffered the
98 See Joan C. Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1559 (1991) (discussing current effects of domesticity).
99 See Finley, supra note 26, at 64.
100 Professor Anita Hill's experiences, see supra note 50, show the diversity of atti-
tudes among women about what conduct is reasonable. Many women understood why
Professor Hill only reluctantly reported sexual harassment years after it occurred. On
the other hand, however, many other women simply did not believe Professor Hill and
dismissed her claims. Various polls found differing percentages of women who be-
lieved, or did not believe, Professor Hill. An ABC News poll conducted on the eve of
the confirmation vote showed that 49% of women found Judge (now Justice) Thomas
more credible. Priscilla Painton, Woman Power, TIME, Oct. 28, 1991, at 24. In a USA
Today poll taken after the hearings, 45% of women believedJustice Thomas, while 26%
believed Professor Hill. Steve Marshall, Poll Sexes in Agreement on Thomas, USA TODAY,
Oct. 14, 1991, at Al. One woman stated, "There were too many inconsistencies in [Pro-
fessor Hill's] story .... I think women are scheming little creatures." Eloise Salholz et
al., Dividing Lines, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28, 1991, at 24.
According to Catharine MacKinnon's perspective, we can dismiss these views as
constructed by genderized power relations. See generally MAcKINNON, supra note 70.
Such a perspective, however, denies women any agency, negating the reality that many
women experience. See Abrams, supra note 83; Colker, supra note 80.
101 If we acknowledged that these actions were sexual harassment, our work envi-
ronments would be intolerable. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1991); cf Littleton, supra note 61
(notwithstanding the pervasiveness of domestic violence, victims are isolated and unbe-
lieved, because of the horror of their reality).
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requisite type of conduct have been harassed or raped; others who
suffer different types of behavior, or react differently to "accepted"
behaviors, have no claim.
Finally, the reasonable woman standard is victim-focused. It is
used in evaluating the behavior of sexual harassment, rape, or do-
mestic violence victims. Rather than the harasser/rapist/abuser be-
ing held to certain standards of behavior, it is the recipent of male
actions who is judged according to whether she reacted
appropriately.
Yet I find myself reluctant to dismiss entirely the reasonable
woman standard. Yes, the reasonable woman standard builds on
earlier stereotypes of women, emphasizing women's virtuous and
sensitive nature in sexual harassment cases, and her passivity in self-
defense cases. Sometimes, however, these images are accurate:
more women than men are apparently offended by certain types of
sexually explicit behavior.102 Some of these images are inaccurate,
especially, of course, in rape cases. Many women are reluctant to
report that they have been raped, not because the rape never oc-
curred, but because they do not want the publicity, or do not want
to acknowledge their vulnerability, or they fear being debased by
the legal process. The question then becomes whether and how to
balance some of the truths behind stereotypes with the damage
caused by the stereotypes in legal theory and practice in these areas.
Stereotypes about women, when "viewed differently, reflect
real injuries of subordination and subtle strategies through which
people cope with a relative lack of social power."' 103 We need not
embrace the stereotypes as accurate in order to acknowledge that
they may contain positive attributes. 104 These "outsider" exper-
102 The research by Pauline Bart on women's and men's attitudes towards pornogra-
phy shows that they respond differently. E.g., Pauline Bart, et. al., The Different Worlds of
Men and Women, in BEYOND METHODOLOGY 171 (Mary Freeman &Judith Wok eds., 1991).
For example, she found that 29%o of women moderately or strongly agreed that pornog-
raphy has its place, compared to 61% of men. Id. at 175.
103 Lucie E. White, Lawyeringfor the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 881 (1990); see also
Kathleen Lahey, On Silences, Screams and Scholarship: An Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory,
in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THEORY 319, 320-21 (1991) (women's silence has
been a form of resistance).
104 Joan Williams has suggested that many of the stereotypes of women as nurturing
and moral as compared to selfish, self-interested men, that underlie Gilligan's work and
feminist difference theory men are more of a "status report" of contemporary gender
role ideology than a description of how women actually behave. Williams, supra note 98.
She suggests that women's behavior is actually far more complex than these stereotypes
suggest: women are caught in a society which promotes a selfish ideal worker, rather
than the moral and nurturing mother that female gender ideology promotes, and wo-
men feel themselves torn between the two competing images. Id. at 82.
As Kathryn Abrams notes, however, Williams's analysis results in "abstracting"
gendered attributes from gender. Abrams, supra note 3, at 1193. Abrams points out
that this is dangerous because men and women often do act differently, and it may bene-
1992] 1417
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
iences contain potential sources of strength and positive imagery, 10 5
although they are not necessarily "more" valid than insider's exper-
iences. Thus, stereotypes that show the effects of disempowerment
can also illustrate strategies of resistance. 10 6 For example, women
used the value of their supposed virtuousness as a reason to get suf-
frage in the early twentieth century. That women had to manipulate
male legislators by using the stereotyped attribute of "virtue" in this
manner does illustrate their comparative powerlessness, but also
shows that they could use this "positive" stereotype to their advan-
tage. Or take "deference," an attribute that Kathryn Abrams labels
"unproductive" for women.10 7 This powerless quality may be an
important component of a reconstructed attorney-client relation-
ship where the attorney defers to her client's goals, encouraging
some clients to assume control over the terms of the representation.
The stereotype here may empower the clients and help the lawyer to
resist the tendency toward lawyer domination.
The reasonable woman standard can be seen as a comparable
strategy of resistance. It was developed by reclaiming stereotypes
about women, using the positive aspects of those stereotypes but
not challenging the utility of the stereotypes themselves.108 While it
fit women to value traditionally female attributes. Id. at 1193-94. Unlike Williams,
Abrams believes it is possible to separate those traditional feminine attributes that are
"desirable" from those that are "undesirable," and to utilize the former while rejecting
the latter. Id. at 1194 & n.47.
I agree, in part, with both Williams and Abrams about the effect of stereotypes and
the need to value gendered attributes. Williams is correct that males are far more "fe-
male" than gender ideology credits them (and, similarly, females are far more "male"
than gender ideology acknowledges); Abrams is right that the positive attributes of what
has been defined as "woman's voice" must be valued as gendered attributes. I think,
however, that it will be very difficult to isolate undesirable attributes because of the te-
nacity and pervasiveness of stereotypes. Moreover, we need to re-examine some of
these negative attributes to help us understand what they say about women and whether,
and how, they can be useful in constructing new images.
105 See Matsuda, supra note 66; see also Patricia H. Collins, Learning from the Outsider
Within, in BEYOND METHODOLOGY 34, 39 (Mary Fonow &Judith Cook eds., 1991) (While
stereotypes are used to control subordinated groups, "many of the attributes extant in
Black female stereotypes are actually distorted renderings of those aspects of Black fe-
male behavior seen as most threatening."). But see Williams, supra note 79, at 317 (not-
ing that, unlike difference feminists, "outsider-scholars" do not try to revive traditional
stereotypes of blacks because they "are so unambiguously insulting.").
106 Women have some power even in a male-dominated society. See Colker, supra
note 80 (if male power were so all-encompassing, there could be no feminist conscious-
ness); Flax, supra note 30, at 56; Linda Gordon, Response to Scott, 15 SIGNs 4 (Summer
1990).
107 Abrams, supra note 3, at 1194 n.47.
108 I am not arguing for a full endorsement or adoption of stereotypes. To the con-
trary, I am arguing for the need to disclose the historical link between certain modes of
self-understanding and modes of domination, and to resist the ways in which we have
already been classified and identified by dominant discourse. This means "redefining []
from within resistant cultures." June Sawicki, Identity Politics and Sexual Freedom: Foucault
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establishes a new standard, however, this standard is one that ac-
cepts that there is a reasonable man, and that the reasonable woman
acts differently from him in ways that the legal system can under-
stand, and that courts can apply.10 9 It does not change the underly-
ing standard, which still applies male notions of reasonableness to
women.
The reasonable woman thus remains an image drawn in reac-
tion to male images of women, which in turn draw upon women's
biological nature.110 Even in the areas of sexual harassment and
battered woman self defense law, where women have assumed some
of the power to define legal images, the resulting standard still can
be destructive to women because it embodies and perpetuates ste-
reotypes and requires women to conform to them. In the rape con-
text, the reasonable woman standard certainly is destructive because
it establishes myths for juries about women's behavior. While some
interpretations of the reasonable woman do help women, the stan-
dard accepts commonly held images of women and as such, is "con-
servative." '11 It constructs rhetoric based on moral or passive
women, regardless of who controls the imaging powers. It is not a
standard that facilitates the slow and careful exploration of individ-
ual client realities. 112
The multiplicity of voices which emerges from the experiences
of individual clients is the undoing of the reasonable woman. As is
clear, the experiences of women in different groups (and the exper-
iences of individual women within these groups) varies. Not all wo-
men who were sexually harassed never indicated welcomeness; not
all battered women are helpless; and some raped women flirted and
acted seductively with their rapist. The variety, depth, and complex-
ity of conduct that can be reasonable within given circumstances
needs to be recognized within legal theory and practice. Although it
and Feminism, in FEMINISM AND FOUCAULT 177, 186 (Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby eds.,
1988).
109 But see Williams, supra note 67, at 106 (arguing that when laws assign benefits
based on whether one is Jake or Amy (Carol Gilligan's paradigmatic male and female),
then "the women who are supposed to be Amys but look more like Jakes, or in some
other way not-Amy, are foreclosed from expressing who they are and are officially invali-
dated for it.").
110 See Schroeder, supra note 16.
111 Jeanne L. Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval Misogynist Stereotypes in Contem-
porary Feminist Jurisprudence, 75 IowA L. REV. 1135, 1216 (1990).
112 This was Elizabeth Schneider's goal in developing women's self-defense. See
Elizabeth Schneider, Lesbians, Gays, and Feminists at the Bar, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 107
(1988). Of course, whenever a new and powerful theory is developed, there is a tempta-
tion to transform it into a "grand theory." See Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in the Grand
Style, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (1989); supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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is easier to use one grand stereotype,113 convenience simply does
not justify this practice.
There are, of course, many practical problems to representing
women's differences while seeking to end (at least some forms of)
discriminatory treatment. Indeed, the issue of how to represent the
complexities of women's experience within the legal system is com-
plicated and frustrating. Professor Abrams suggests various meth-
ods for presenting multiple views to a legal forum, such as
presenting the interests of different clients in an amicus brief.114
The reasonable woman standard is another attempt to represent
women's differences, at least by suggesting their differences from
men (although not from each other). While it essentializes women,
the standard is, nonetheless, an attempt to meet the need for differ-
ent standards that respond to concrete realities.
B. Practice: How the Stereotype of the Reasonable Woman
Affects Attorney-Client Relationships
Our clients come to us for many different reasons, with diverse
backgrounds and motivations, not all of which are comprehensible.
We translate their experiences into legally recognized claims or de-
fenses. 115 We see individual clients, but we also see these clients as
manifestations of larger patterns."16 In fact, it is imperative to de-
termine whether similar claims have been made by others, and what
strategies have been effective.1 17 Consequently, stereotypes operate
within the attorney-client relationship for both attorney and cli-
118 Abrams, supra note 83; Olsen, supra note 112.
114 Abrams, supra note 2, at 393. This strategy may work well at the appellate level,
where amicus briefs serve as a recognized forum for presenting multiple overlapping
and supporting perspectives. See Sally Burns, Notes From the Field: Reply to Professor Colker,
13 HARV. WOMEN's LJ. 189 (1990) (discussing the development of amicus briefs in
Supreme Court cases).
But the problems are more difficult at the trial level. Nonetheless, trial counsel
often do convey a multiplicity of perspectives when they plead in the alternative as per-
mitted under procedural rules. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) ("A party may set forth two
or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically .... A party may
also state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of consis-
tency."). Even under this strategy, which presents multiple, possibly competing claims,
each claim is considered separately, without an attempt to develop a whole mosaic.
115 "The job of a lawyer is to re-present her client's views in such a way that the
client's 'story' comes across as compelling to ajudge orjury." Kim L. Scheppele, Telling
Stories, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2073, 2090 n.53 (1989); see Cunningham, Thinking About Law,
supra note 8, at 2492 (contrasting "re-presenting" with translation).
116 For a discussion of how we apply these patterns, see Steve Winter, Contingency
and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 963, 993-94 (1991).
117 1 mean "effective" in the limited sense of the plaintiff achieving the purpose of
her suit, as declared in her pleadings. I am not addressing empowerment.
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ent.118 For the attorney, the focus in these cases is often on whether
her client is a victim and whether she meets the requisite standards
for legal recognition. 119 The lawyer must try to fit her client ("the
victim") into an acceptable story so that she can win. Her actions
must become "reasonable," as that term is defined, by some com-
munity standard.120 Rather than examine standards of conduct that
allow the aggressor to behave as he has, we must instead examine
our client's actions to see whether she is a worthy victim. If she did
not resist enough, if she led him on, or if she did not leave when she
had (what we now see as) the opportunity, then she did not act suffi-
ciently reasonable and will not win. Instead, she will be blamed for
talking to a man, flirting and teasing, drinking too much, or being
too wild.12
At the same time as we scrutinize her individual behavior, we
are trying to fit her into a group with distinguishable characteristics.
We are familiar with the legal requirements for sexual harassment
victims, battered women, and rape victims. There are syndromes
that help to describe their behavior. We want our clients to fit into
the recognized patterns. Not only does it make our jobs easier, but
118 See Alfieri, supra note 10, at 2124 (poverty lawyers name their clients as depen-
dent); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. LJ.
1499 (1991) (discussing dominant visions of the poor).
119 For an example of how a rape survivor had to be represented as weak and vulner-
able, rather than angry, see Kristin Bumiller, Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence
Against Women Legal Culture in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF THE LAw 95 (Nancy S. Thomuelsen
& Martha Fineman eds., 1991). For a comparable discussion of homelessness and vic-
timization, see Lucie E. White, Representing "The Real Deal", 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 271, 298
(1990-1991); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 46 (1990) ("The lawyer had scripted
[her client] as a victim. That was the only strategy for the hearing that the lawyer...
could imagine for [her client].") [hereinafter White, Subordination].
120 See Ehrenreich, supra note 28; Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1152 (1985).
121 See Camille Paglia, Rape: A Bigger Danger than Feminists Know, NEWSDAY, Jan. 27,
1991, at 32 ("A woman going to a fraternity party is walking into Testosterone Flats ....
A girl who goes upstairs alone with a brother at a fraternity party is an idiot."); Ann
Landers, After Hours of Petting, It's Too Late to Stop, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 4, 1991; see also VALE-
RIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 204 (1986) (citing studies ofjury atti-
tudes in rape cases that reflect male perspective of what is reasonable: many beieved
50%o of all rapes are reported by women seeking revenge on men or trying to cover for
an illegitimate pregnancy); 2 Charged with Assault on Student from Loyola, Cm. TRIB.,
Sept. 9, 1987, § 2, at 4 (two men who allegedly gang raped a woman were charged with
misdemeanor criminal sexual assault rather than felony rape because woman had been
drinking and delayed reporting the incident until the morning after it occurred). But see
Naomi Wolf, We're All "Bad Girls" Now: Our Lives are Just as "Lurid" as Those of Alleged Rape
Victims, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1991. Similarly, as discussed infra, in our domestic violence
cases, it is more difficult to construct a case to support a client's receipt of a protection
order, especially for women who are too angry, hit back, started fights, or who left home
without their children.
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it also may help our clients overcome some of the distrust directed
against them, so that they will be believed.
Thus, the actual physical violence committed against our clients
may be compounded by their lawyer's and judge's reactions.122 An
example from one of my classes shows the potentially damaging ef-
fects of stereotyping within the attorney-client relationship. We
were exploring the reasons that battered women might stay with
their abusers. Many of the students suggested that the battered
woman was a victim of learned helplessness and could not leave for
psychological reasons. Then a formerly battered woman, who had
observed hundreds of cases and talked with thousands of victims,
spoke. She suggested that the battered woman may stay because
she loves her abuser and cannot afford to live apart from him.
A lawyer who cannot see (or understand) how love affects a bat-
tering relationship or the importance of economics is missing im-
portant aspects of her client's life. 123 She will not understand why
her client stays with the abuser or returns to him. As a result, she
will grow angry and frustrated with her client, and perhaps seek
ways to terminate the representation. This will make her client feel
blameworthy for her "unreasonable" love for the batterer, and the
client will feel judged-by her own lawyer-at the moment she first
enters the legal system. Of course, understanding this context does
not ensure that the attorney will not become angry and frustrated;
however, her emotions will be tempered with understanding.
Even if she does understand her client's circumstances, in her
role as intermediary between the client and the court, the lawyer
may nonetheless choose to portray her client in a certain way so that
she will win. I do not criticize feminist lawyers for trying to help
their clients in this way. But having achieved some success, we must
evaluate the costs and benefits of existing legal standards and the
mode of their development within-and to-the attorney-client re-
lationship. A reasonable woman image does help make difficult sto-
ries more comprehensible within the legal system. However, the
same problems that arise from theoretical insights also appear in
practice. First, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, the reason-
able woman standard essentializes women. It defines characteristics
that a reasonable woman must exhibit in order to become a reason-
able client who may succeed. 124 Consequently, it excludes all other
122 See Schneider, supra note 25 (abuse of battered woman self defense syndrome);
White, supra note 7.
123 See Littleton, supra note 101, at 43-47; Mahoney, supra note 101.
124 See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text; see also Shirley Sagawa, A Hard Case
for Feminists: People v. Goetz, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 253, 266 n.71 (1987) (citing to
criminal case in which defense counsel's use of battered woman syndrome was held er-
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characteristics as unreasonable. Second, the image marginalizes
those women whose stories do not fit within the image, and those
women who have different, and difficult, stories to tell. 125 For exam-
ple, what do we do with the sexually harassed woman who had a
consensual sexual relationship with her harasser and then sued
him?1 26 What about the woman who was raped by a former boy-
friend with whom she previously had consensual sex?127 What
about the victim of domestic violence who wants custody of her chil-
dren but has "abandoned" them when she fled the violence, or
worse, has beaten them?' 28 As lawyers, we must look at the entire
contexts in which these actions occur in order to make sense of
them, and we must convince courts to examine context, rather than
to rely on summary standards.' 29
Third, although the reasonable woman standard emerged from
women's actual experiences, it has since been overtaken by lawyers
and legal theorists. Consequently, it shifts power from women to
their lawyers.' 30 Rather than challenging definitions, women must
still accommodate their experience to someone else's reasonable-
ness standard. Moreover, because reasonableness is a powerfully
roneous because the relationship between the victim and the defendant did not conform
to the "characteristic patterns" of the syndrome).
125 Interview with Marie Ashe, Oct. 4, 1991; see Naomi R. Cahn, A Preliminary Feminist
Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL Em-ics 23 (1990).
126 E.g., Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School Dist., 715 F. Supp. 862 (N.D.
Il1. 1989); cf Shrout v. Black Clowson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (em-
ployee has duty to notify superior, with whom she had a consensual sexual relationship,
that continued contact is unwelcome).
127 State v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165 (Wash. 1988); State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470
(N.C. 1984); Estrich, supra note 21, at 60-65 (discussing Alston).
128 See Marie Ashe & Naomi Cahn, Abuse of Women and Children: Issues for Feminist
Theory, 2 TEx. W. LJ. (forthcoming 1992); Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women:
The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991)
(discussing battered women who abuse their children).
129 Of course, we must also figure out how to set limits. See Abbe Smith, Presenta-
tion at Frontiers of Legal Thought: Race, Gender and Justice (Duke University School
of Law, Jan. 24, 1992) (discussing criminal defendant who shot two women after he saw
them making love because he is homophobi'). In setting these limits, we may appear
arbitrary: why should domestic violence be relevant, while homophobia is not? My an-
swer is that we must choose certain determinate values. SeeJoan Williams, Rorty, Radical-
ism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 131, 143 (discussing the
possibilities of certainties without absolutes-we can believe in right and wrong so long
as we recognize that they are arbitrary beliefs).
130 See White, supra note 103, at 886 (arguing that poor people must take the power
to define themselves away from the courts); see also Tove S. Dahl, Taking Women as a
Starting Point: Building Women's Law, 14 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 239, 239-40 (1986) (articulating
the purpose of women's law as describing, explaining, and understanding actual exper-
iences to improve their position in law and society; women's experience is removed from
the subjects themselves and becomes filtered through the interpretations of their
lawyers).
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drilled-in legal standard (beginning in first year torts), it is difficult
for lawyers to challenge the paradigm of reasonableness.
We represent our clients in a system that has excluded women
from the legal process. 13 1 As we think about litigation on behalf of
women, we must beware of reverting to traditional methods of
thinking and developing doctrine. Instead, we must focus on the
impact of our theory on practice as a method for understanding the
impact of doctrine on images and cultural stereotypes of women
that operate within the attorney-client relationship.
C. A Representation
A client representation that occurred in our clinic illustrates
many of these themes. 132
We first met Arlene Sims at our Citizens' Complaint Center,
where the local police send virtually all victims of domestic violence.
She came in through Center intake with a one-page form setting out
a summary of her reason for being there. She had already seen at
least two people that day, one from the local prosecutor's office and
another from the Court Social Services office. She had been at the
Center since nine a.m.; by the time we interviewed her, it was about
two p.m.
A student in my clinic called her into our office from the central
waiting area. Ms. Sims followed slowly. The student began by apol-
ogizing to Ms. Sims for the long delay at the Center and that she
hoped we would be the last people Ms. Sims needed to talk to that
day. Ms. Sims looked up, and smiled a little. The student explained
that she was a law student, acting under the supervision of an attor-
ney-professor. She then informed Ms. Sims that we understood she
was at the Center because her husband had beaten her with a chair,
and that she wanted to go to court about this. The student then
asked, "Is this accurate?"
131 See White, Subordination, supra note 119, at 20-21 (while some women do partici-
pate "fluently" in the legal process, many are unable to do so).
Historically, of course, married women did not have a legal existence separate from
that of their husbands. See Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-
1850, 71 GEO. LJ. 1359, 1361 (1983). Women have also been excluded from practicing
law. See KAREN B. MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR (1986) (history of women in the legal
profession); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Mak-
ing New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29 (1987).
132 To protect my clients and my future practice, the facts in this case are based on a
compilation of several cases and, for this reason, I have summarized the attorney-client
conversation. Clark Cunningham has commented that my methodology takes away the
client's voice. Because Ms. Sims does not exist, there was no way to get her permission
to use her actual words; yet, I did not want to invent either her actual words or mine.
This article, then, omits illustrating some of the steps in the process of how client lan-




Ms. Sims said, "yes." Looking back, I am not sure what she
meant; what we later learned she wanted and what had happened to
her were different from what the intake form stated.
Ms. Sims explained that she already had a civil protection order
(CPO), but that had not stopped her husband from beating her.
The student asked for a copy of the CPO; it did indeed direct Mr.
Sims to stay away from his wife, and not to molest or assault her.
We also noticed that the order was issued by consent. Ms. Sims and
her husband, with the help of a victim advocate, had negotiated the
terms of the order. The victim advocate is not a mediator, and she
explains at the start of each session that she is there to help the
complainant. The advocate has handled virtually all domestic vio-
lence cases in the local court for more than ten years, and is sensi-
tive to power disparities between the parties. She is also skilled at
negotiating terms that the complainant wants and that are accepta-
ble to the abuser. When the parties consent in this kind of process
there is no hearing. The judge generally reads out the terms of the
agreement, and makes sure both parties understand the penalties
for a violation. Even though such orders only direct batterers to
stay away from victims, judges often tell victims also not to go any-
where near the batterer.
The fact that an abuser consents to a civil protection order does
not necessarily mean that he admits to any of the allegations under-
lying the initial complaint. Nor does it mean that he is more likely to
comply with the order than if it had been issued after a full fact-
finding hearing. It often does mean, however, that the abuser is in-
timidated by the court process, that neither party wants to explain
all the details of their relationship in court, or that the parties still
have some type of minimal relationship. Ms. Sims explained later
that she felt intimidated by being in court and had gone through the
consent process because she did not want a hearing. She was con-
cerned,' however, that because there had been no court hearing, Mr.
Sims had not taken the court proceedings as seriously as she had.
This was of particular concern because, as Ms. Sims explained, she
and her husband still lived within one block of each other. She con-
tinued to visit friends on his street, and he lived with her uncle.
Within the previous two weeks, he had beaten her twice. The
first time, he came to her house one weeknight to visit their three
children, Alice, who was two years old, Jim, who was five, and Dan,
who was seven. Even though the civil protection order allowed him
to visit only on weekends, she let him into her house. She explained
that she wanted him to see the children, and that she was also scared
he would bang on her door until she let him in. As soon as he
walked in, he began to hit her, punching her on the right side of her
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face with his fist, kicking her legs. She screamed, and by the time a
neighbor came to the door, he had stopped. We could still see the
faint bruise marks on her face.
The second time he beat her after she refused to hand over the
keys to "his" car. When they were first married, Mr. Sims bought a
1980 Chevy. Ms. Sims did not work, so he provided the car pay-
ments and kept up the insurance. While he was at work, she used
the car mostly to drive the children to and from school, to go gro-
cery shopping, and for other errands. At the court hearing on the
CPO, neither of them had brought up use of the car, so the order
said nothing about it. Because he had lost his keys, she knew that
she had the only set.
Ms. Sims explained that on the day before she came to the
Center, she and the children had stopped to visit some friends on
her husband's street after doing grocery shopping. As she was
standing in front of a friend's house, she saw Mr. Sims pull up in his
truck. He parked, and she watched him, hoping he would not come
near her. He came towards her, yelling at her to give him the keys
to his car. She ran into her uncle's house (also her husband's home)
to ask him for help. Mr. Sims followed her inside the house and her
uncle walked outside, leaving her in the house with her husband.
He again demanded his keys. She ran into the kitchen, and got a
knife, because she did not think he would let her leave the house.
She tried to leave the house, but he blocked the door. She was
somewhat confused about what had happened next. She believes
that he picked up a chair and approached her with it, and that she
stabbed him as she tried to ward him off. He then lifted the chair
over his head and brought it down on her head several times. A
friend of his ran into the room and told him to stop beating her.
She left, got her kids, went home, and called the police.
About an hour later, two officers appeared. She showed them
her CPO, but they told her that there was nothing they could do
because he was no longer around and they had not seen anything
happen. They referred her to the Center for help. This police re-
sponse seemed frustrating to her-it certainly was to me. I had just
finished working on a survey of how the police respond to domestic
violence victims in the District of Columbia, which found that,
notwithstanding a police general order to the contrary, the exis-
tence of a CPO had little effect on police response.'3 3
As she told her story, Ms. Sims was soft-spoken and matter-of-
fact. Even when she showed us the bruises, her demeanor did not
133 Karen Baker et al., Report on District of Columbia Police Response to Domestic
Violence 45 (1989) (unpublished study, on file with the Cornell Law Review).
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change. She seemed prepared to talk to many "professionals"
before she could get help. She said that what she wanted was for
Mr. Sims to stop abusing her. She had hoped the CPO would take
care of his violence; it had not, and she was resigned to taking the
next step. When we told her that we might be able to represent her,
she seemed desperate for our help. Several times, she asked if we
really thought we could represent her, and she seemed genuinely
glad when we said we would. When she asked if it made any differ-
ence to us that she had refused to give him the car keys, run into his
house, and then used a knife against him, we reassured her that it
did not. We tried to take photographs of her bruises (they did not
appear on our Polaroid pictures), and arranged to meet with her two
days later so that we could file the necessary court papers to enforce
her CPO through a motion for contempt.
During the next few days, the student and I had numerous dis-
cussions about how to handle the second incident. We were con-
cerned about what might appear to a judge to be "inconsistencies"
in her story, such as her grabbing the knife and stabbing him.
Clearly, he had approached her first and she had acted only in self-
defense. Refusing to give him the car keys seemed reasonable be-
cause she did not want to be bullied by him, and she needed the car
for family errands. Running into her uncle's house to ask him for
help also seemed reasonable, although we did wonder why her
friends on the street did not try to protect her. We assumed that she
did not want to involve any of them in her "personal" problems,
and that they did not even know that she had a civil protection or-
der. When we asked her why she had run to her uncle rather than to
a friend, she explained that he was family and knew something
about her relationship with her husband; while her friends were also
her husband's friends and they told her they did not want to get
involved in choosing sides. We struggled with how to present these
facts to a judge, who might blame Ms. Sims for visiting friends on
her husband's street, not leaving as soon as he arrived, running into
"his" house, and drawing a knife on him.
In discussions with Ms. Sims, we developed two theories. Our
first theory concluded that any reasonable woman in her situation
would have acted as she did. Many of her friends lived on the same
street as Mr. Sims did and she did not want to stop seeing them nor
always ask them to come see her. Her friends were also his friends;
these friends knew little of his past violence, and thought he was a
decent man. Given this, she could turn only to her family for help.
After her uncle refused to help her, she had to help herself. When
her husband still lived with her, he had broken her nose, pulled out
her hair, and threatened to do worse. She feared him, justifiably
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and reasonably so. Grabbing the knife was an act of desperation. In
this version of the story, she would tell the judge that she was con-
fused about when exactly she had stabbed him with the knife.
In our second story about the incident, Ms. Sims was a lifelong
victim.1 3 4 She had become stuck in an abusive situation, and was
unable to step out of a cycle of violence with her husband. Her fa-
ther had abused her mother, and her mother had abused her. She
expected abuse in a relationship. In the first incident that formed
the basis for the contempt motion, she knew that he had been build-
ing towards a severe beating, notwithstanding the CPO. She let him
into her house, resigned to his abuse. In the second incident, she
again knew that a beating was inevitable, and almost literally walked
into it. She had grabbed the knife, but felt unable to use it to hurt
him, and in fact dropped it quickly.
The facts in both stories were true (that is, they corresponded
to Ms. Sims's actual experiences). In discussions with Ms. Sims, we
needed to decide which story had fewer "inconsistencies," whether
she would have a better chance at winning a contempt proceeding if
she appeared to be a victim or a reasonable woman.13 5 We three
lawyers preferred the reasonable woman approach because it al-
lowed Ms. Sims some dignity in telling her story to the judge and in
front of her husband. We knew, however, that at the time, she was
not thinking about whether her reactions were reasonable. More-
over, as her representatives, we felt it was important to let her know
that we believed many judges would find her actions unreasonable
and provocative. A judge quite simply might not believe that she
had acted reasonably in visiting friends across the street from where
her batterer lived, running into his house, and then stabbing him.
We told her we especially feared this result because we tried to talk
to the friend who intervened in the second beating, but he told us
he did not want to get involved. In a case where ajudge must deter-
mine credibility based on the parties' testimony, with a high burden
of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt), a judge simply might not be-
lieve her, and could easily find reasonable doubts about her actions.
We did not have a trial. On the day we were scheduled for
court, she decided that rather than having a hearing at which the
penalty might be jail time for him, or at which she might lose, she
134 See White, Subordination, supra note 119, at 46. Our victim theory was based on
the cycle of violence/battered women syndrome identified by Lenore Walker. See
sources cited supra note 94.
135 At the time, the stories seemed too inconsistent to combine. On reflection, I
think we could have tried harder to combine the two images. Even so, we might have
faced the same issues in court. It may also be that the stories are too divergent. See
Delgado, supra note 77, at 2411 (discussing different stories for dominant and subordi-
nant social groups).
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would rather Mr. Sims relinquished possession of the car and paid
child support. She reasoned that he could not earn money while he
was in jail. Thus we do not know whether our reasonable woman
strategy would have worked in practice.' 36
Looking back, I am particularly aware of the risks of painting
her actions as reasonable to a court. Mr. Sims clearly violated the
order, and Ms. Sims's actions are irrelevant. Nonetheless, his be-
havior could be excused or justified because of her actions. Even to
me, her behavior initially seemed somewhat risky, not quite reason-
able. I imagine that if I were in her situation, I would have called
the police as soon as he came over on a weeknight to visit the chil-
dren. But then I remember that not only did she not have a phone
at the time, but in the past when she called the police, they had not
come in time.137 I also imagine that I would give up visiting my
friends, so as not to run into him. And I believe that I could never
stab anyone.' 38 But I do not really know.
My definition of the actions of a reasonable woman is based on
my own experiences. I am not a black mother of three who receives
AFDC and has been battered by my husband. The only way that I
can begin to represent her situation is to know as many facts about
her life as possible, to understand my position in interpreting
them,' 39 and to examine the power structures underlying her
136 Another story shows the gap in understanding that we feared. A friend recently
represented a victim of domestic violence who had been raped repeatedly over a ten
year period. The victim testified that she returned to her batterer because he promised
not to rape her again, and because she could not earn enough money to support herself
and their children. The judge simply did not believe that she could have stayed for ten
years with a man who repeatedly raped her (and thus it must not have been rape). Stay-
ing with her rapist-husband simply does not appear to be the action of a reasonable
woman. Mahoney, supra note 101, at 64; West, supra note 13; see also Maryland Special
Joint Committee, Gender Bias in the Courts 7 (May 1989) (judges do not understand why
victim of domestic violence might not leave the abusive situation or might return to her
husband). Another influence may have been that, until recently, marital rape was a legal
contradiction.
137 Several courts have found that police respond discriminatorily to domestic vio-
lence calls. E.g., Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Com. 1984); see
Carolyne R. Hathaway, Comment, Gender Based Discrimination in Police Reluctance to Re-
sponse to Domestic Assault Complains, 75 GEO. LJ. 667 (1986).
138 My doubts illustrate some of the limits of the method of "participant observation
study." My beliefs and knowledge are central to this story. I have labelled this story "a
story of representation" because it is my story of how I represented this client, both to
myself and within the legal system. See Ross, supra note 112, at 1546; White, Subordina-
tion, supra note 119, at 45 n.143.
139 Clifford Geertz suggests that any interpretation is particular and holds different
meaning in any cultural setting. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 167-234 (1983).
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story. 140 How can we possibly give such a "thick description"' 14 1 to a
judge, given current definitions of relevance and limited images of
reasonableness for poor black battered women? 42
III
PRACTICE STRATEGIES
We have seen how the reasonable woman standard affects sex-
ual harassment, domestic violence, and rape law. When it emerges
from women's experiences, it has the capacity to help women, to
make women feel less alien in the legal system, and to make wo-
men's experiences appear more credible. When the standard devel-
ops from a male legal system, it clearly disadvantages women.
Obviously, when it responds to the concrete realities of the lives of
women who are using the legal system, it succeeds; in any other situ-
ation, as in the context of rape law, it fails, and, indeed, damages
women. What, then, do we do with the reasonable woman stan-
dard? How should it affect legal strategy and representation?
It seems to me that we can choose from several possible ap-
proaches. Understanding its dangers of essentialization, marginal-
ization, and potential disempowerment, we can nonetheless
embrace the standard when it does account for women's lives, and
reject it in all other situations; we can use a reasonable person stan-
dard; or we can articulate a new standard that does not depend on
an analysis in each situation of whether the reasonable woman im-
age developed from women's lives. Whichever of these difficult
strategies we follow, it must be accompanied by revisions to the at-
torney-client relationship.
140 See Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597,
1647-52 (1990) (in examining the particular experiences of individuals, it is important to
examine larger patterns of power and oppression to aid in judgment).
141 See ALICE MILLER, BREAKING DOWN THE WALL OF SILENCE 156 (1991) (explaining
that because an American fighter pilot's feelings were frozen inside of him, he could not
feel the anger and powerlessness of the people he was bombing). Geertz borrows this
term from Gilbert Ryle to refer to "the multiplicity of complex conceptual structures,
many of them superimposed upon or knotted into one another, which are at once
strange, irregular and inexplicit and which [an ethnographer] must contrive somehow
first to grasp and then to render." CLIFFORD GEERTz, Thick Description: Toward an Inter-
pretive Theory of Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3, 10 (1973). That is, there
are multiple levels of significance to any single action.
142 On the difficulties of doing exactly this, see Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 35.
The problem lies not just in the the lawyer's ability to translate the client's story, but also
in the law itself. While much of lawyering does involve translation, see Cunningham,
supra note 7, and interpretation, it requires some responsiveness, some similarity of con-
cepts, between the law and the original speaker. These concepts simply may not exist.
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A. Reasonable Person Standard
One solution, in accord with sameness theory, is to give mean-
ing to the "reasonable person" standard. The reasonable person
would not become simply a linguistic substitute for the reasonable
man; rather, it would be "premised squarely on an androgynous
rather than a male prototype." 143 This androgynous creature would
combine gendered male and female attributes, and would transcend
the characteristics of each sex. It would embody a standard that
could be universally applied. To develop a new conception of the
reasonable person standard requires taking the "male tilt" out of its
existing application 144 so that it truly establishes a new standard.
The reasonable person standard has the advantage of simplicity
and custom. We are accustomed to evaluating reasonableness. In-
deed, the reasonable person appears to provide a neutral and ab-
stract standard so that the law is not interpreted according to the
whims of individual judges or juries, but instead is based on a socie-
tal consensus. 145 Reasonableness protects against the extremes of
the egg-shell plaintiff and the sledge-hammer defendant by setting
out a mediating middle ground with seemingly determinate stan-
dards. In addition to providing neutral norms, a reasonable person
standard, rather than a reasonable woman standard, prevents gen-
der-attributed characteristics from controlling the appropriate legal
standard.
Nonetheless, the standard may be impractical in implementa-
tion, as well as undesirable in theory. It is subject to the same criti-
cisms as traditional conceptions of sameness feminism. Use of the
reasonable person construct has not meant sudden equality for wo-
men, it has meant applying a male standard under a different
name. 146 Theoretically, we may be confining ourselves and our cli-
143 Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 367 (1984-1985). But see Lit-
tleton, supra note 95, at 1292-95; West, supra note 87, at 22; Frances E. Olsen, The Family
and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1577 (1983);
Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereot)ping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 471, 476 n.22 (1990).
144 Wendy Williams argues that feminists must challenge "in court a male defined
set of structures and institutions ... [using, among others] a doctrinal tool with which
to begin to squeeze the male tilt out of a purportedly neutral legal structure." Williams,
supra note 143, at 331.
145 For analysis of the falseness of this consensus, see Ehrenreich, supra note 31, at
1204-07; see also Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normality
in Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 944 (1991) ("We must preserve the fiction that
normative principles are neutral authorities we consult, humbly and objectively.").
146 Senator DeConcini used a reasonable person standard, and drew on his exper-
iences in deciding to believe Justice Thomas, rather than Professor Hill. See supra note
50. The Norman court stated that a reasonable person does not kill a sleeping spouse.
See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
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ents if we adopt a reasonable person standard. Moreover, as with
the reasonable woman, a reasonable person standard pretends that
there is an objective neutral standard that can be applied appropri-
ately to all facts. As Lucinda Finley notes, "the purportedly objec-
tive reasonable person standard may actually be subjective due to its
failure to include a variety of perspectives and experiences and its
use of biased stereotypes."' 147
B. Reasonable Woman Standard
The reasonable woman standard developed from the exper-
iences of outsiders. As such, it provides valuable information about
how the legal system has excluded women. It also forces lawyers to
consider how existing standards are male-biased, and how they can
be changed to become more inclusive. Yet it differs from a gender-
neutral standard because of its explicit focus on women; it requires
the fact-finder to think about the reasonable woman's reactions to a
particular situation, rather than proceeding from the perspective of
the reasonable man or reasonable (male-dominated) person.' 48
The reasonable woman is a powerful image because of its implicit
critique of the reasonable man. Its very phrasing shows that the rea-
sonable man is a gendered, exclusionary standard.
When we litigate, we need concrete strategies that show the in-
adequacy of existing standards. Using a reasonable woman stan-
dard in sexual harassment cases dramatizes why behavior that many
men find acceptable constitutes harassment to women. 149 In the
rape context, a reasonable woman standard could explain why a
woman failed to report her rape, perceived a man's behavior as
threatening, or did not understand herself to have consented to
sex. 150 The reasonable woman standard is seductive because it not
147 Finley, supra note 26, at 63.
148 See Estrich, supra note 21, at 859 (noting that some courts are "ready to meet the
challenge" of protecting women from sexual harassment by pointing to the adoption of
the reasonable woman standard in Ellison v. Brady); see also Ehrenreich, supra note 31, at
1207.
149 See Abrams, supra note 3, at 1202-03.
150 For example, some states still require marital rape to be reported within a certain
time period, or else there was, legally, no rape. In Virginia, marital rape must be re-
ported within ten days. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2-61(B) (Michie 1988); see Cathleen M.
Gillen, Violence in Marriage: A Comparison of the Legal System's Approach to Domestic Violence
and Marital Rape, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript on file with Cornell
Law Review).
As Kim Scheppele explains, "[a]dopting the 'reasonable woman' ... allows wo-
men's views to have a strong impact on the outcome of rape trials while simultaneously
putting men on notice that they must consider how women's perceptions of sexualized
situations may be very different from their own." Kim L. Scheppele, The Reasonable
Woman, THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Fall 1991, at 45.
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only sounds like familiar language (the reasonable man or person),
but unlike the traditional language, it explicitly includes women.
Nonetheless, as Clark Cunningham points out, when one
speaks a particular language, its limitations seem so natural that
they are invisible.' 5 ' The term "reasonable woman" is both legal
language and feminist language; its very familiarity as legal language
obscures its problems. It still assumes the possibility of defining the
reasonable woman's perspective, both imagining the theoretical
likelihood of a standard capable of general application to women,
and pretending that, in practice, judges can apply the standard in a
"neutral" fashion that will benefit women. 152 Indeed, it tries to sep-
arate the process of applying the law from the substantive content of
the law, which depoliticizes the law.' 53 That is, it does not recognize
that the process of applying the law is interrelated with the actual
content of the law.' 54
Consequently, courts that use a reasonable woman standard
can apply it in a manner that subordinates women just as easily as
one that supports women. As with the reasonable person standard,
a mere change in language does not, alas, mandate a change in ap-
plication and result. The trial court judge in Rabidue v. Osceola Refin-
ety Co. 155 explicitly used an "average female employee" standard in
support of its finding that no harassment had occurred. 156 In rape
cases, the reasonable woman standard-as currently developed and
articulated (albeit not by feminists)-hurts women. When we leave
the interpretation of substantive norms "to the sole discretion of
judges, most of whom are upper-or middle-class white men,"
they will naturally perpetuate their traditional white male view-
point. 157 On this perspective, women are subjected to a reasonable
151 Cunningham, Lawyer as Translator, supra note 8 at 1319; see generally Delgado &
Stefanic, supra note 35 (racism and sexism maybe so imbedded in our culture as to ob-
scure their existence).
152 See Finley, supra note 26, at 64.
153 See William Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement. Moderation
as a Postmodern Cultural Norm, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 765 (1991).
154 See, e.g., Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829 (1990).
155 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aft'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
156 Id at 433. The conduct that was not harassing included: "In common work
areas plaintiff... [was] exposed daily to displays of nude or partially clad women be-
longing to a number of male employees .... ; a male employee who "regularly spewed
anti-female obscenity"; and a general exclusion in formalities that Ms. Rabidue (the only
female manager) needed access to in order to to her job. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 623-34
(Kieth, J., dissenting).
157 Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 420 (discussing evi-
dentiary rules). Similarly, the substantial discretion that judges enjoy in other areas
often disadvantages women. Id.; see, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Gender Bias in the Courts: So-
cial Change Strategies, 4 GEO.J. LEGAL Emnics 1, 18-21 (1990) (discussing effect ofjudicial
discretion in child support awards).
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woman standard that is again constructed with male bias. 158 In-
deed, the goal of making the reasonableness standard reflect the ac-
tual experiences of women may be too difficult because of this
entrenched bias that prevents judges from analyzing conduct and
circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable woman (rather
than a reasonable man labelled a reasonable woman). 159
Moreover, the reasonable woman standard establishes a stan-
dard for women that differs from the standard for men, incorporat-
ing and perpetuating stereotypes of women. This suggests that men
are not harmed by conduct that a reasonable woman might find of-
fensive. This conclusion is unjustified. Some men may be injured
by the same harassing behaviors that subordinate women. Men can
be harmed by a legal standard that tolerates domestic violence, not
only by its affect on them as children, t-ut also by its relationship to
fostering violent and abusive behavior in other men.' 60 Moreover,
the perpetuation of certain stereotypes of women can reinforce lim-
iting stereotypes of men. For example, the image of women as sen-
sitive, delicate, and needing protection in the workplace from
conduct that men easily tolerate, reinforces the restrictive images of
men as the necessary breadwinner and provider, thick-skinned and
hardened.' 6 1 Finally, the actions of a reasonable woman may differ
depending on whether she is black or white, rich or poor, a profes-
sional or unemployed. The reasonable woman standard does not
include these multiple perspectives, generating instead a cookie-
mold stereotype.' 62
Having said all that, however, a reasonable woman standard
may remains a better alternative than any other formulation based
solely on reasonableness. The standard could be applied to both
men and women, ensuring that one standard governs behavior.' 63
Indeed, it could even be applied to the behavior of the harasser-
abuser-rapist to judge whether his behavior was reasonable. 164 Its
very language instructs courts to think from a different perspective
than that of the reasonable man or person. Notwithstanding its ca-
pacity for misinterpretation, the reasonable woman standard en-
158 Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 777, 809 (1988).
159 Id.
160 Cahn, supra note 128.
161 Williams, supra note 16.
162 The intent of the standard was actually different. Within the legal system, how-
ever, in the interest of ease of application, or in order to accommodate expectations
about women's behavior, the standard has collapsed into itself.
163 Donna Lenhoff, General Counsel of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, sug-
gested this as one solution to the practical quandary of litigating sexual harassment
cases. Interview with Donna Lenhoff (Dec. 7, 1991).
164 Of course, this would mean a dramatic shift in how cases are structured.
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courages judges and juries to recognize the impact of different
gender ideologies on the actions of women, and on their own expec-
tations. 165 It can also help clients like Ms. Sims feel more "fluent"
within the legal system by formulating legal rules in terms that are
meaningful in her experience.
C. Towards a New Standard
Given the problems with both a reasonable woman and a rea-
sonable person standard, we need to develop a new conception
against which to understand and evaluate behavior. A new standard
must recognize that reasonable men and women can and do disa-
gree both within and across gender groups; yet it must also acknowl-
edge that prevailing gender, race, class, and sexual orientation
ideologies construct a different and subordinate role for (sometimes
intersecting) groups. Such a new standard must reformulate rea-
sonableness, not merely because of its indeterminacy but because it
is a mirage. It is an illusion that promises objectivity but actually
incorporates subjective beliefs, and an imaginary standard that does
not describe how people such as Ms. Sims think about their actions.
It also allows (encourages) lawyers to reshape their clients' stories to
conform to this objective standard. I envision a standard that is tai-
lored to the experiences of individual litigants in a manner similar to
that proposed by Lucie White for poor people's hearings. 166 As
Professor White explains, in order to "shap[e] the law to respond to
the needs of subordinated groups[,] the power to tailor must shift to
those that the tailoring seeks to help. Those who have been diag-
nosed as different, as disabled, must assume the power to describe
their own circumstances." 167
Consequently, a new standard would presume that each
woman's experience be viewed according to how she experiences
it. 168 Rather than listening for a story that constructs one dominant
image in the courtroom, we must develop ways to admit multiple
voices and images. Instead of requiring a victim to conform to pre-
existing images, a new standard would be contextual, focusing on
the victim's actual reactions.1 69 It would incorporate all the circum-
165 It might drastically alter the range and types of evidence admissible, as has al-
ready happened with respect to battered women syndrome. For other possible effects
on evidence, see Kinports, supra note 157.
166 See White, supra note 103, at 877-87.
167 Id. at 886-87.
168 But see RosemaryJ. Coombe, supra note 6, at 80 (claiming that we cannot rely on
a particular woman's belief as to whether she has consented to intercourse because
those beliefs are "invaded by social power and dominant notions."); MAcKINNON, supra
note 70, at 177 ("women are socialized to passive receptivity.").
169 To some extent, this proposal is similar to a standard articulated by Kathryn
Abrams. She suggests that the victim's "description of the defendant's sexually oriented
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stances surrounding a woman's actions. In the rape context, for ex-
ample it would ask, Was the consent to sex mutual, 170 neither
economically nor physically pressured? If there was any form of
pressure, when did it occur? How did the woman perceive the pres-
sure? How did it make her feel at the time she "consented"? Such a
standard subjectively considers the pressure on an individual who is
a member of a community with explicit standards for her behavior.
This new standard could permit lawyers to return to the excite-
ment of learning from our clients' experiences in order to craft
more effective and responsive legal theories. Such a standard must
draw its strength from communities of disempowered people, while
seeking to change prevailing community attitudes. Its application
entails educating judges so that they better understand and respect
victims' perspectives.' 7 1
This new contextual standard is justified because it responds to
the texture of our clients' lives and gives them space to speak their
own words. While reshaping clients' stories is certainly appropriate
in some instances, 172 both the lawyer and her client must acknowl-
edge the lawyer's role as intermediary, her role in translating the
client's (narrative) language into law language (rules). 73 By recog-
nizing the diverse nature of our clients' stories, a new contextual
standard allows for the diversity of real experiences, and recognizes
the distortion imposed by any particular doctrinal standard. This
may allow litigants to feel "counted" within the legal system, pro-
viding the recognition and validation that are important goals of
many who seek legal relief.174 And it ensures the continuing re-
sponsiveness of legal doctrine to legal practice.
Of course, one major problem with such a standard is its sub-
jectivity. It ignores the perpetrator's intent, focusing instead on the
victim's context, resulting in broad indeterminacy of legally appro-
priate behavior.' 75 Given the importance of mens rea to our concepts
behavior and of the feelings of coercion or devaluation it produced would establish the
plaintiff's prima facie case." Abrams, supra note 3, at 1209; see also Brief Amicus Curiae
of Women's Legal Defense Fund, Robinson (proposing standard that credits plaintiff's
credible allegations). The standard set out in this Article differs in its focus on the vic-
tim's context and its attention to the attorney-client relationship.
170 Chamallas, supra note 158, at 837-39.
171 For suggestions, see Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990).
172 See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
173 See Cunningham, Lawyers as Translator, supra note 8; Cunningham, Thinking About
Law, supra note 8; Cahn, supra note 27.
174 See JOHN CONLEY & WILLIAM O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS (1990).
175 Many of us are suddenly concerned with line-drawing. Women I know report the
same type of conversation with men about where to draw the line between appropriate
and inappropriate sexual behavior. Indeed, some might argue that this is not "law" at
all; rather it is a process of ad hoc authoritative exercises of discretion.
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of responsibility and the importance of the presumption of inno-
cence to our adjudicative system, we want to find deliberate, or at
least reckless, disregard for the victim's rights or interests before we
impose liability.' 76 We have rapists who claim, "I didn't intend to
rape her-I thought she consented," or harassers who state, "I
didn't know that my conduct was unwelcome to her," or batterers
who stated (before they were killed), "I didn't intend to hurt her
again." Can we ignore their understandings so that it is the victim's
perspective that becomes dominant?
To some extent, the legal system has ignored the victim's per-
spective, focusing only on that of the perpetrator.177 That is, bur-
dens of production and persuasion in the legal system are allocated
to assume that the perpetrator's conduct was reasonable, asking
only if the victim's conduct was reasonable according to the perpe-
trator. 178 The "objective" reality of what happens in rape, sexual
harassment, or domestic violence cases is how the man thinks about
his conduct.' 79 This does not mean that we should make women's
experiences the only reality; we must recognize that there are multi-
ple realities. A new standard could recognize the multidimensional
nature of disputes 8 0 and experiences of reality. Instead of labelling
the male reality the "objective" one, each reality is both objective
and subjective for the participants. In the past, one reality has been
dominant; both must be weighted more equitably within the legal
176 A recent survey of sex bias in criminal law teaching concluded that "[t]he central
role of mens rea... in criminal responsibility is reflected in the almost universal cover-
age of the 'mistake of fact' defense [in rape cases]." Nancy Erickson & Mary Ann La-
manna, Sex-Bias Topics in the Criminal Law Course: A Survey of Criminal Law Courses, 24 U.
MicH.J.L. REF. 189, 208 (1990).
See Scheppele, supra note 150, at 45 (noting that given the harshness of penalties
and stigma for criminal conduct, "[t]o base criminal convictions on potentially idiosyn-
cratic perceptions of victims is unfair to those accused.").
177 See David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship:
A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1034-35 (1990).
178 The possibility of asking whether the reasonable woman (man or person) would
have acted as did the perpetrator adds another dimension to this picture. The reason-
able woman makes more explicit the existing focus on whether she acted reasonably,
given his conduct; perhaps we should focus on whether he acted reasonably, given her
conduct. See id.
179 MACKINNON, supra note 70, at 180.
180 See Brenda Danet, Language in the Legal Process, 14 LAW & Soc. REv. 445, 509 &
n.32 (1980) (noting that while
[d]isputes constitute two different versions of reality, each advocated with
all the resources-linguistic and nonlinguistic, substantive and formal-
the parties can muster, [i]n fact there are likely to be more than two ver-
sions of reality since even witnesses on the same side may vary considera-
bly in their versions of events.).
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system.' 8 ' Even with a presumption of innocence, one could infer
intent from the victim's perceptions and the perpetrator's actions.
In this way, the facts that had previously been "discounted" would
be heard in a new way.'8 2
A second problem with a more subjective standard is that in its
focus on the victim's perspective, it requires that she expose her
feelings. The reality is that this already happens: when a victim
comes forward, she is put on trial. Under a standard of conduct that
respected her reality, she could explain her experiences in a sup-
portive, or at least nonjudgmental, environment rather than a
criticial one. For example, the notion of "imminence" in self-de-
fense law would be flexible enough to accommodate the genuine
perceptions of a woman who viewed her sleeping batterer as a threat
(unlike the person with "ordinary firmness"). In employment dis-
crimination cases, the law could acknowledge the influence of power
relationships in the workplace so that a woman could explain why
she did not complain loudly and often about harassment. In rape
cases, the concept of consent would be transformed to one of real,
affirmative consent, so that a woman could explain why, notwith-
standing her past sexual activity, forced intercourse with a social ac-
quaintance was still rape: she knows when sex is consensual and
when it is not.
Finally, a new context-based standard may not always be appro-
priate in all cases. We may need "broader" norms, at least in some
cases.183 But this, too, is a context specific inquiry, which recognizes
that setting out one standard is sometimes, but not always,
reasonable.
To see how this standard would work in practice, I suggest
some reforms within the attorney-client relationship that would
transform traditional standards to take account of different exper-
iences, without setting out a separate standard for each gender.
181 See Abrams, supra note 50, at 979 (many lawyers believe that the "truth" can best
be established by a "neutral decisionmaker with the task of discovering it.").
I am focusing on the process of constructing and valuing alternative narratives.
This process dramatizes the problem of conflicting narratives, an issue that Abrams does
not directly address. Where two people tell compelling, resounding narratives, how do
we know which is "right"? How can we move away from "neutral" arbiters without
trusting all to the discretion ofjudges? For some thoughts, see Ashe & Cahn, supra note
128 (the first step is telling new stories); Sally E. Merry, The Culture ofJudging, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 2311, 2327 (1990) (suggesting it is appropriate to consider allowing in some
aspects of "pluralism" into judging); Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations
of the Aspirations for our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877 (1988) (exploring how feminist
notions of caring can inform judging); see also Martha Minow & Elizabeth Spelman, supra
note 140 (an analysis of context and power can lead to better judgments).
182 Finley, supra note 26, at 64-65.
183 See Fechner, supra note 70, at 487.
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D. Transforming the Attorney-Client Relationship
Phyllis Goldfarb has pointed out that feminists have much to
learn from legal clinicians about the nature of the legal system, cli-
ent stories, and the attorney-client relationship. 184 In addition, fem-
inists have much to learn from practicing lawyers and clients. Some
feminists have begun this process by examining the legal methods
that we use in challenging the law's exclusion of women's perspec-
tives and the different claims of truth implicit in those methods.
Others examine women's relationships to other actors in the effort
to produce social change.' 8 5 I too ask how feminists have used the
legal system to produce change, but also ask how do we think about
feminists as litigators? What changes must we make in our methods
in order to practice feminist representation of our clients? What
happens when a particular theoretical construct is used in practice?
What about when a practical construct is transformed, through
court decisions or scholarly commentary, into legal theory?
While there are many theoretical perspectives from which to ex-
plore answers to these questions, any answers must include an ex-
amination of the representation process 186 and the attorney-client
relationship. It is not enough simply to develop theory; we must be
concerned about what happens when it is implemented.
Underlying this problem of implementation is a concern with
power issues in the surrounding society as well as within the attor-
ney-client relationship. 187 A complicating factor is the existence of
many distinct power issues in the attorney-client relationship in the
184 Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 1689-90.
185 Abrams, supra note 2; Bartlett, supra note 154.
186 Representation is a complex process and has multiple strands, including: 1) the
client's representations to herself concerning the nature of her problem and her use of
the legal system; 2) the client's representations to her lawyer; 3) the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client to the world outside of the attorney-client relationship; 4) the lawyer's
representations to the client within the attorney-client relationship; and 5) the lawyer's
representations to herself concerning her client. This Article has focused on the last
three aspects because they are the ones to which I, as a lawyer, have easy access. It is
easy to see how the reasonable woman standard affects these three levels by allowing for
the creation of a comfortable yet novel image such that these three forms of representa-
tion are in accord.
Awareness and understanding of these different levels of representation can help in
rebuilding the attorney-client relationship. See Goldfarb, supra note 3, at 1675-1687
(suggesting how to reshape the attorney-client relationship into a method that joins per-
sonal and professional ethics).
187 Michael Foucault identified the importance of deconstructing power issues. See,
e.g., Michael Foucault, Truth and Power, in THE FOUCAULT READER 51 (Paul Rabinow ed.,
1984). Robin West disagrees with Foucault, arguing that power is not a creative force
because women are silenced and unable to develop their own discourse under patriar-
chal power. Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. Ci. L. FORUM
59, 59-65. She points out that we must look at the violence inflicted by this power,
rather than the structures it has constructed. Id.
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cases discussed in this Article. One is women's powerless position
in a male-dominated society, which breaks down further into white
women's positions relative to white men and "minority" women's
position with respect to white men and women and "minority" men.
A second is clients' relationship to their lawyers, which can, in turn,
be seen as the result of the inherently distorting nature of legal doc-
trine-when lawyers translate clients' stories into the law, the result-
ing story is always different 88 and the problematic nature of the
representation process itself.18 9 Because of these inherent power
structures, lawyers must be careful to respect their clients and to
ameliorate, or at least avoid aggravating, the pre-existing power
structures in the attorney client relationship. The most meaningful
strategies in legal representation have emerged as lawyers learn
from their clients. Others have suggested some strategies that law-
yers can use to work with their clients. Gerald Lopez suggests a re-
bellious style of lawyering that requires lawyers to work with, not
merely for, their clients. 190 This involves an understanding of the
context and complexity in which legal issues arise,' 9' as well as a
willingness to work with other professionals who are similarly com-
mitted to confronting subordination.' 92 Tony Alfieri suggests strat-
egies that allow lawyers to break out of client stereotypes by
reinterpreting client stories. 193 Lucie White focuses on how lawyers
shape their clients' stories. 194 Underlying these practices is a need
for the lawyer to be critically aware of her motivations. She must
188 As Brenda Danet points out, "the 'facts' of a case do not preexist but are con-
structed through interaction." Danet, supra note 180, at 509 (citing Thomas J. Scheff,
Negotiating Reality: Notes on Power in the Assessment of Responsibility, 16 Soc. PROB. 1 (1968)).
Lawyer client talk helps to construct the facts; indeed, lawyers need to appreciate that
"language is not only a tool they use but a cultural artifact that subtly channels .... "
Lawrence Rosen, A Consumer's Guide to Law and the Social Sciences, 100 YALE LJ. 531, 537
(1990) (book review).
189 Of course, not all women are subordinated to all men. Issues of race, class, and
sexual orientation are intertwined in women's relationship to men. Similarly, in many
situations clients are not subordinated to lawyers. E.g., Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Prac-
tice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV. 503 (1985) (showing the dominance of client interests in large law firms);
see William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Re-
sponsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 144 (1992).
190 See Lopez, supra note 8, at 1608; see also Gerald Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to
Work with the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L.
REV. 305, 358-60 (1989) [hereinafter Lopez, Training Future Lawyers] (suggesting changes
in legal education to prepare students to engage in this rebellious style of lawyering);
Gerald Lopez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1985) (pointing out
that modern legal education does not seek to address, much less to understand, the
concerns of low-income women of color).
191 See Lopez, Training Future Lawyers, supra note 190, at 381-82.
192 See Lopez, supra note 8, at 1608-09.
193 Alfieri, supra note 10.
194 White, supra note 119.
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understand when she is using others' images, rather than her cli-
ent's, for what she sees as her client's advantage.
Three other aspects of this mode of lawyering lead to a contex-
tualized approach to lawyering. First, a client-centered representa-
tion recognizes clients' varied goals-to win, to tell their stories, to
feel respected by the legal system (including their lawyers)-and at-
tempts to translate these goals into the legal system. 195 Second, a
representation process must also respect that a lawyer herself is not
completely neutral and objective. Third, there needs to be a recog-
nition of the importance of explicit examination of the doctrine and
practice interconnection.
First, a client-centered representation recognizes that clients
come to lawyers for many reasons. They may seek access to the
legal system because they have no other choice, 196 they want the
legal system to validate their claims, they seek to tell their stories to
a judge, 197 or they want a particular legal result. As lawyers, we
must understand our clients' needs, and then use doctrine accord-
ingly. This means listening to our clients.' 98 For the client who
wants to win, it may be appropriate to reshape her narrative and fit it
into a stock story, rather than risking a more innovative turn to nar-
rative strategy. For a client who wants both to win and to tell her
story to a judge, we need to explore her willingness to take the risk
of losing, especially if her story does not conform to prevailing
norms of reasonableness. A client like Ms. Sims wants to use the
legal system to send a message to her abuser that his behavior is
illegal, and that the law, at least, gives her some power over him. 199
195 These suggestions assume that lawyers and clients want to use the legal system
so that clients can tell their stories. However, I am not here proposing an immediate
overthrow of the legal system, and the construction of a new system in which all clients
could tell their stories. See Kathryn Abrams, Lawyers and Social Change Lawbreaking: Con-
fronting a Plural Bar, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 753, 783 (1991) (exploring different motivations
of lawyers with respect to working within and outside of the legal system).
196 See Austin Sarat, "... The Law is All Over": Power, Resistance and the Legal Conscious-
ness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 359-65 (1990).
197 See CONLEY & O'BARR, supra note 174 (although they discuss unrepresented liti-
gants, their conclusions about the motivations of parties apply as well to represented
litigants).
198 A study of physicians found that empathetic doctors who listen to their patients
are more satisfied with their work and have patients who are more satisfied with their
medical care. Daniel Goleman, All Too Often, The Doctor isn't Listening, Studies Show, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1991, at Cl, C15.
For some discussion on listening in attorney-client relationships, see DAVID BINDER
ET AL., LAwYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1990); Robert Diner-
stein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 502, 604
(1990).
199 See MERRY, supra note 22 (concluding that this was one reason that women in
abusive relationships sought court protection).
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As lawyers, we need to help clients clarify their goals, and explore
the risks of different strategies.
This is particularly important given the diversity of client sto-
ries and objectives. Not all clients tell sympathetic stories; lawyers
do not (and should not) represent only those clients who initially
relate legally "winnable" tales. For these "unwinnable" clients, we
may be obligated, ethically and morally, to transform their unsym-
pathetic stories into compelling ones that will prevent further beat-
ings or harassment. Indeed, we can contextualize their stories in
ways that they might not be able to do themselves in court, or that a
judge might otherwise be unable to do.2 0 0 For example, a battered
woman who "abandons" her children when she leaves the batterer
may have left the children because she was fleeing for her life.
Alone in court she might not explain the history of violence, how it
made her feel, how she felt her options were restricted, or how
scared she was of assault at separation. 20 A woman who was sexu-
ally harassed may not, without the aid of an attorney, be able to
explain why she did not leave her work situation after she was sexu-
ally harassed, why she needed to continue at the job, why the con-
tacts and references she established were helpful. 20 2 This additional
information might be overlooked unless her lawyer tries to under-
stand and appreciate her client's context, without judging her cli-
ent's actions.
Second, many feminist lawyers undertake representation be-
cause of their commitment to legal reform. Lawyers may choose to
represent particular clients to achieve larger goals that benefit all
women, 2 S and can choose to use their own experiences to inform
200 Clients really do need some form of translation during this process. Poverty law
clients often do not speak in the language recognized by courts. See id.; Barbara Bezdek,
Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript on file with Cornell Law Review).
201 See Mahoney, supra note 101, at 79-80:
The idea that the woman should have left the relationship and especially
the idea that she failed to leave, shapes the court's analyses of many as-
pects of self-defense cases, including the reasonableness of the woman's
perceptions and reactions, the imminence of the threat of death or threat
of bodily harm and her duty to retreat from the confrontation.
202 See F. Lee Bailey, Where Was the Crucible? The Cross Examination that Wasn't, A.B.A.
J. 46-49 (Jan. 1992) (pointing out that Anita Hill did not have any lawyers who were her
advocates).
203 See Bums, supra note 114, at 191 (addressing the importance of challenging
"forces that obscure women's interests" as "[o]ur first duty to ourselves as litigators and
to our clients"); Cahn, supra note 3, at 12-14 (discussing work of ACLU Women's Rights
Project); Ruth Cowan, Women's Rights through Litigation: An Examination of the American
Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REv. 373,
374 (1976) (acknowledging that the Project resulted in a "blurring of the distinction
between litigant and advocate"); see also Abrams, supra note 195 (exploring motivation of
lawyers in representing socially subordinated groups).
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the representation process. 20 4 They thus empathize with the partic-
ular goals of their clients, and place the particular representation in
the context of a larger effort to challenge women's subordination.
Consequently, there is a danger that the lawyer will impose her
feminist theories on the client without listening to her.205 To some
extent, this danger is unavoidable.20 6 All lawyers have a particular
philosophy that they impose on the attorney-client relationship. For
example, the professional responsibility rules for lawyers, which
control the ethics of representation, are not neutral.20 7 The values
they elevate-professional neutrality-e.g., zealous advocacy-may
conflict with feminist goals of empowered representation because
feminists do not advocate professional neutrality and may want to
redefine the meaning of zealous advocacy. 208 Therefore, it is impor-
tant to ensure that one's perspective is explicit to oneself and to
one's clients; and to question how it affects client narrative. 20 9
Accordingly, lawyers must remember that it is not their ideals
but the client who is being represented. This means ensuring that
clients are involved in the representation process. Although the
rules of professional ethics tacitly permit lawyers to control every-
204 For examples of personal experiences informing litigation, see, e.g., Cahn, supra
note 3, at 14; Katrina Grider, Hair Salons and Racial Stereotypes: The Impermissible Use of
Racially Discriminatory Pricing Schemes, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 75 (1989); Schneider, supra
note 112.
205 I observe this tension in many different situations. For example, when Ms. Sims
did not want to go forward with the contempt proceeding, I was torn: feminist theory
argues that prosecution may be in the woman's best interest. See Naomi R. Cahn & Lisa
G. Lerman, Prosecuting Woman Abuse, in WOMAN BATTERING: POLICY RESPONSES 95
(Michael Steinman ed., 1991); LISA G. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNO-
VATIONS IN CRIMINALJUSTICE RESPONSE (1981); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice Sys-
tem's Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV.
267 (1985). I did not want to manipulate her, but I did want the violence to stop. I had
to step away from theory and respond to my client's objectives. (This is, of course, a
simplification of the issues presented and ignores issues of false consciousness).
206 See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563,
646-49 (1982) (arguing that paternalism is pervasive and desirable).
207 Cahn, supra note 125.
Some have critiqued the system because it is self-serving, protecting lawyers at the
expense (literally and metaphorically) of their clients. See Thomas Morgan, The Evolving
Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977); see also Richard Abel,
Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L. REV. 639 (1981) (suggesting the
answer is to legitimize the legal profession). Others have critiqued the system for ignor-
ing the interests of third parties who are affected by any particular client's decisions. See
Peter Margulies, "Who Are You To Tell Me That?" Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Non-
legal Issues and the Interests to Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990).
208 See, e.g.,JACK &JACK, supra note 88, at 92 (describing a lawyer who used an ethic
of care to resolve his case and "flirted" dangerously with violating the conflict of interest
and disclosure rules).
209 See Austin Sarat & William Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in
the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE LJ. 1663 (1989).
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thing but the underlying "objectives" of the representation, requir-
ing only that "[i]n questions of means, the lawyer should assume
responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues," 210 representa-
tion can and should be more of a collaborative process. 211 Even
though true collobaration is extremely difficult (some suggest im-
possible),21 2 it is an appropriate goal. In attempting to approach
this goal through a critical self-awareness, we can improve existing
relationships.
Third, a new type of lawyering must consider the influence and
effects of doctrine on practice. Much of the distortion (and even the
"rhetorical violence") 213 that occurs in the attorney-client relation-
ship results from the limits of doctrine. We shape our clients into
reasonable women because only they can win. But at least in some
circumstances, we must challenge the effect those stereotypes have
on client relationships, as well as in the courtroom. Theories such
as the reasonable woman do not develop in a practice-free vacuum;
they are based on the realities of practice, or at least on cases and
laws that result from someone's practice.21 4 But theoretical insights
must maintain a continuing dialogue, and dialectic, with practice. 215
We can begin to implement this changed form of practice by
sharing information, power, and empathy. For me, a telling exam-
ple of this need is my experience with doctors. With their knowl-
edge, jargon, and instruments, they intimidate me. I know that
through them, I can gain access to a whole new embodied world, if
only I cooperate. Once they begin talking to me, I forget any ques-
tions I had, or else I do not ask them for fear of being labeled troub-
lesome. I am ready to take whatever advice they give me, even if I
210 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 cmt. 1 (1983). The Rules
acknowledge that it may be difficult to distinguish between the objectives of representa-
tion (over which the client has control) and the means of representation, and that "in
many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of ajoint undertaking." Id. Nonethe-
less, the rules do not require this type of undertaking.
211 See Andrew D. Gitlin, Educative Research, Voice and Social Change, 60 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 443 (1990). Even in a collaborative process there is a risk of manipulation, of the
lawyer redefining the client's goals and problems. See Stacey, supra note 8 (pointing out
these problems with ethnographic study itself).
212 See Marilyn Strathern, An Awkward Relationship: The Case of Feminism and Anthropol-
ogy, 12 SIGNS 276, 290 (1987) (arguing that feminists believe that the anthropological
ideal of a truly colloborative process is a "delusion" given the underlying power
relationships).
213 See White, supra note 7.
214 For example, a significant impetus to the development of the battered woman
syndrome resulted from Lenore Walker's studies of battered women, and from the need
in cases to explain battered women's actions. BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 94; Schnei-
der, supra note 20; Walker, supra note 94.
215 This is not an obvious point, as Elizabeth Schneider emphasizes as well. See
Schneider, supra note 2; Schneider, supra note 25; Schneider, supra note 45; Schneider,
supra note 112.
2 '
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have little or no understanding of my diagnosis or treatment. I feel
disempowered and unrespected.2 16 It is only with great effort that I
can overcome my own paralysis. From this experience, I can only
begin to imagine what it feels like to be a client.2 17
There remains an issue of "meta"-manipulation. By sharing in-
formation and power, I am manipulating my client so that she be-
comes my image of an appropriate client. I want a client who will
collaborate with me in any manner she can, just as I want to collabo-
rate with her in the ways I can. 218 Is imposing this image on my
client just as violent as imposing a reasonable woman standard on
her? Perhaps. As Tony Alfieri perceptively points out, I am con-
fronting contradictions between "client-centered decisionmaking
and lawyer authority .... ,,21 These contradictions are further rein-
forced by doctrine. Even though I know that these contradictions
may never be resolved and that lawyers by themselves will never
overcome them, I believe it is important to recognize and to chal-
lenge them. I thus accept that there are some images of the attor-
ney-client relationship which are better than others, 220 and fostering
new forms of that relationship is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Much of feminist theory has emerged from feelings and exper-
iences of exclusion.221 The practical reality of confronting stan-
dards that explicitly and implicitly exclude women's experiences has
216 See Goleman, supra note 198.
217 Such empathy, however, can be dangerous. See Trina Grillo & Stephanie
Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implications of Making Comparisons between
Racism and Sexism, 1991 DUKE L.J. 397; see also GEERTZ, supra note 139, at 59 (describing
the need to move beyond Western conceptions of empathy to see others' experience in
their own framework).
218 As such, this differs from the family law lawyers studied by Sarat and Felstiner,
who shared knowledge and demystified the legal system, but only in an attempt to bol-
ster their own authority and better maintain client control. Sarat & Felstiner, supra note
209.
219 Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1233, 1247 (1992).
220 While I am not claiming access to a universalized truth, I am claiming that, from
my standpoint, I can imagine that there are less manipulative types of attorney-client
relationships. Postmodernism has shown the dangers of universalized narratives; see,
e.g., Fraser & Nicholson, supra note 64. But feminists have critiqued postmodernism for
not acknowledging its own point of view(s) on the impact on women of power struc-
tures, and the need for some type of grounding. See e.g., Bordo, supra note 32, at 140; see
also Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 644, 681-682 (1990) (choosing between competing interpretations requires
"ethical and political" criteria) Joan Williams, supra note 129, at 134, 153-154 (noting
the importance for pragmatists of looking at patterns of oppresion to - their theories).
221 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 131; Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989
Wis. L. REV. 539.
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encouraged theory. 222 Indeed, feminist theorists continually ac-
knowledge their debt to practice. 223 Yet in this role, practice merely
serves as a predicate, as a stepping-stone, to theory. Theory is the
goal, practice merely a method to help achieve that goal. A more
appropriate sequence is to view theory and practice as a continuous
iterative process, with adjustments in one prompting refinements in
the other. It is not sufficient to draw upon practice when we develop
theories; our theories must return to practice.
That has been my goal in this Article: to show how theory and
practice must be intertwined, 224 and how concepts of practice must
extend to the attorney-client relationship. At times, it is easier to do
one or the other: in practice, we may be too focused on the multi-
tudes of clients who need our help to think about theory; as theore-
ticians, we may never represent a client and thus may never be
forced to grapple with the need to develop concrete strategies that
either will change the law as it is interpreted or will help real clients
win. In theory, we can abstract the actual violence that occurs in
women's lives, and overlook the physical damage inflicted. 225
The reasonable woman standard has emerged from practice,
and it accords with some strands of feminist theory. As theory and
practice learn from each other, however, we see the dangers of the
standard, as well as the difficulties of developing new standards that
reflect women's (sometimes different) experiences and yet do not
confine women in male norms. As theory remains grounded in
practice and ethnographic, localized study, not only of courts, but
also of what happens in the attorney-client relationship, we can truly
begin to construct new images of women in law and in practice.
222 Cahn, supra note 3, at 3-5, 8-10.
223 E.g., Littleton, supra note 12, at 18.
224 See Finley, supra note 89, at 891; Schneider, supra note 2, at 610; see also Elizabeth
M. Schneider et al., "Feminist Jurisprudence"--The 1990 Myra Bradwell Day Panel, 1 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 5 (1991) (noting perspectives on the relationship between feminist the-
ory and practice); Fineman, supra note 9.
225 SeeJEssICA BENJAMIN, THE BONDS OF LOVE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND THE
PROBLEM OF DOMINATION 216 (1988); White, supra note 7.
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